Where does the ruling discuss public places? The article quotes the ruling as saying, “An individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in records about his cell phone’s location.” I don’t think a ruling about private records held by a private entity like google or a phone company naturally extends to surveillance of public places.

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seplox 3 hours ago | parent [-]

> I don’t think a ruling about private records held by a private entity like google or a phone company naturally extends to surveillance of public places.

Even when the surveillance is being conducted by a private entity? A private entity that's selling access to its private records of the comings and goings of a sizeable chunk of the population to police who are buying specifically because it would be a 4th Amendment violation for them to collect the data themselves?

If it's reasonable for we consumers, who know that cell networks and phone makers are collecting our data, to expect privacy, then it's reasonable to extend that same expectation to operators of ALPR and related techs. There's no opt-out, after all. We can't reject the terms of service.

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anigbrowl an hour ago | parent [-]

I suspect the argument against that would be that you contract with the cell service provider and so have a colorable interest as a party to said contract. In contrast you have no such contractual relationship with Flock, and if your government contracted with them on your behalf your remedy is to vote harder.

	▲	seplox 14 minutes ago \| parent [-]
		According to the ruling, the exposure of your location history is the automatic price of conventional cell-phone usage—which, just as Carpenter noted, is a "pervasive and insistent part of daily life." If we can't step out of our houses or drive to the doctor without that fact getting placed into a searchable database, then I'd argue that it qualifies as a "pervasive and insistent part of daily life."