> No, his point is that being unable to do that was (or at least should have been) a forgone conclusion.

No, not at all. As I said, controlling straits and keeping them open for shipping is a fundamental function of a navy going back to Roman times: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_navy (“By far, the navy's most vital task was to ensure Roman grain imports were shipped and delivered to the capital unimpeded across the Mediterranean.”).

The inability to keep the strait clear shouldn’t have been expected. It’s a purely military objective that’s squarely within what our ridiculously overspecced Navy should be able to do.

It is a fundamental function in the general sense, yes. But I don't think anyone was expecting that the US could do so in hormuz in this instance (at least without committing far more assets of a non-naval variety). I also think there are plenty of examples that take the form (strong navy, narrow body of water) where failure would be expected but that doesn't mean the navy in question isn't capable or that it fails to fulfill its role.

Similarly it is a fundamental function of the infantry to maintain ground control over a region but it is easy to come up with hypotheticals where any given power including the US would fail to do so.

> It’s a purely military objective that’s squarely within what our ridiculously overspecced Navy should be able to do.

I'm sure they could if cost was of no consequence but depending on the size of iran's drone stockpiles the interceptor costs might well bankrupt us. And even then they would only manage because (I assume) iran either can't or won't employ hypersonic missiles against tankers.