I wouldn't trust governments, today or in the future, to keep such a system private and I don't see a foolproof way of building some kind of audit mechanism into it to make sure the data is always truely private.

I've also always been curious how a truely anonymous identity verification could possibly work. At best for age verification, I could be given some kind of token that would still have to verify my age and be verifiable with a central authority to ensure my token is valid. The central authority could always keeper records of my token, revoke it whenever they please, and every entity that can verify the age associated with, or embedded into, the token knows at least some of my PII.

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vkou an hour ago | parent [-]

> I've also always been curious how a truely anonymous identity verification could possibly work.

You go to a store. You show the clerk your id and give him a quarter. The clerk pulls a scratch-off ticket from the front of a ticket tape. The ticket contains a token identifier.

It's anonymous. The clerk or his POS system knows your name and age, but doesn't know your number. The vendor providing the tape doesn't know your number or your name. The system accepting the token knows your number, but doesn't know your name. The token is only valid for a day after use, so loss and transfer isn't much of an issue.

It's the exact same process by which you buy lottery tickets in a world where they don't need to verify your identity when you redeem them. The lottery has no idea who bought a particular ticket, only that a ticket was bought. The clerk knows you bought a ticket, but doesn't know which ticket.

Obviously, Eavesdropping Eve looking over your shoulder knows both your name and your ticket number, but that's not a practical attack.

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Aurornis an hour ago | parent | next [-]

> It's anonymous. The clerk or his POS system knows your name and age, but doesn't know your number. The vendor providing the tape doesn't know your number or your name.

Where does this 3rd party identity token provider come from?

For government-issued identity tokens, there are not separate parties. It's just the government, and they can choose to link whatever they want in their internal system if they decide it's in the interests of national security.

You're also forgetting that lottery tickets are tracked. This is how they can announce which store sold the winning ticket before anyone steps forward with it. It would be trivial to match a buyer to the ticket if they wanted to inspect the records. In the case of a government identity token service, there isn't even a separation of parties providing the records. They do it all and can have all the data.

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vkou an hour ago | parent [-]

> Where does this 3rd party identity token provider come from?

Some oracle whose job it is to print tokens and hand out rolls to the stores (and to the websystems). They would know which store got which roll, and which website authenticated it, but not who each ticket from that roll went to.

With a big enough roll, this is essentially anonymous.

Yes, lotteries know which store got the winning ticket, but they have no idea which of the patrons in the store got it. Not unless they ask Eve to get her telescopic lens and notepad out.

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Aurornis an hour ago | parent [-]

I'm talking about identity token services.

You're saying the real solution is that we bring in a private, 3rd-party company to start checking our IDs to access websites now?

	▲	vkou an hour ago \| parent [-]
		I was asked if this problem can be solved in an anonymous manner. I gave a solution that is pretty anonymous and fairly cheap. I am not actually advocating for it. I'm just saying how it's possible to solve it given those constraints.

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simoncion an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-]

> It's anonymous. The clerk or his POS system knows your name and age, but doesn't know your number.

What prevents a commercial "AI" security camera analysis firm from doing a decent job of linking footage of a store's customers to a likely subset of tokens, based on the knowledge of which tokens are sent to which store and how many tokens have been pulled off of the roll so far? Remember that you can design the token roll packaging so the easiest thing for a clerk to do is to pull off the rolls in the order in which they were shipped. Or -hell- you can design the token dispenser so that it phones home to the oracle that sent the roll to the store with the range of tokens in the roll when the roll is loaded into the dispenser (for "security purposes").

> It's the exact same process by which you buy lottery tickets in a world where they don't need to verify your identity when you redeem them.

I've seen many people buy lotto tickets. I've never seen anyone asked for ID. Perhaps the merchant is supposed to check for ID, but they don't. Relatedly:

> The clerk pulls a scratch-off ticket from the front of a ticket tape. The ticket contains a token identifier.

What prevents rolls of those tickets from falling off of a truck and either being handed out for free or at a substantial markup, no questions asked? [0]

In the real world, the system you propose absolutely will not function to the standards required by the people agitating for these systems. You can't "protect the children" if "children" can easily get their hands on anonymous access-granting tokens.

[0] The fact that this doesn't happen with lotto tickets often enough to be newsworthy is not a compelling counterexample. Stores make a decent amount of money selling those, and wouldn't want to get cut off from that revenue source by regularly "losing" shipments of tickets. What you propose doesn't make stores any money, so either you have to spend a bunch of money to induce them to carry the tokens [1], or you have to have harsh penalties for "losing" shipments of tokens. If you risk harsh penalties for choosing to sell the tokens, why even bother? Stores put up with the risk of selling booze because it's quite profitable... selling 5c or 0c tokens absolutely is not.

[1] Where does that money come from? From you and me, of course!

	▲	aspenmayer 28 minutes ago \| parent [-]
		I’ve worked in the industry, so just adding some extra info, as I agree with you that the ticket system is not really less tracked than other systems, just differently tracked: Lottery tickets don’t “fall off of trucks” or get “lost in the mail” because they aren’t valid for redemption until they’re activated at the POS terminal of a licensed store, and the lottery company knows which store receives each ticket roll, because they are shipped to known locations with tracking numbers and delivery verification and/or delivered in person by lottery employees. Even the rolls of blank lottery ticket receipt paper have different serial numbers every few inches, and it’s forbidden by policy to swap receipt paper between stores. All of these things are audited both regularly and randomly by state lottery officials.

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aspenmayer 44 minutes ago | parent | prev [-]

> It's the exact same process by which you buy lottery tickets in a world where they don't need to verify your identity when you redeem them.

I’ve sold lottery tickets, and you have to be legal age to both buy and redeem them, so I’m not sure that this analogy or hypothetical solution is comparable to lottery tickets, nor is it likely to be the panacea you think it is.

I don’t think that the nascent online age verification schemes are good for society in general, either, but that’s not really the point you were making in your comment, so I don’t assume that you believe they’re good or bad, but simply advocating for a more privacy-preserving implementation. Which is kind of the whole point of the argument against bad implementations, but those who mandate and implement the systems likely view uniquely identifying people as a boon, whereas you and I probably don’t, which is why I am not hopeful that your ticket system will be used, because it will be higher friction for more people than uploading scans of their IDs and/or their face.

The ticket system, if implemented, would be used by so few people that the folks who do could likely be re-identified by Bluetooth tracking beacons and facial recognition in the same stores which they bought the ID tickets you suggest, and so I think the number of people who would escape tracking by any such means to be so few as to be a rounding error.

Those folks who do pursue this privacy hobby/fetish are statistically likely to ultimately mess up on their opsec eventually on a long enough timeline, so it’s hard to even imagine a scenario in which it matters either way what individual privacy activists do or don’t do from the point of view of the panopticon designers or implementers. Those not identified to a desired confidence interval by the mass surveillance system will just be retargeted for more sophisticated surveillance measures.

Despite how we rage, we’re still just rats in a cage.

More and more, the privacy debate feels like a quixotic struggle against giants, when everyone already knows that those giants are actually windmills; the majority of society now lives on reclaimed lands which rely on those windmills’ continued existence, and so no one cares about privacy in the way that you or I might care, because they are incapable of perceiving windmills as giants, nor do they have the intellectual or philosophical or political beliefs which would allow them to even entertain such perceptions even for the purposes of discussion. The privacy debate is beyond their ken.