| ▲ | explodes a day ago | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Looks like these safeguards are in place: * System and root directories cannot be selected. * Can only being activated after user action. * Requires https. * Double-confirmation for write access. No API like this could ever be bulletproof, but it's a start I guess. Very cool API though, and it really does open up a whole new world of possibilities. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| ▲ | ptx a day ago | parent | next [-] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Those are some pretty flimsy safeguards. I don't keep my secrets in system directories and using HTTPS doesn't mean the site isn't malicious. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| ▲ | mschuster91 a day ago | parent | prev [-] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
> System and root directories cannot be selected. That desperately needs something like the Public Suffix List [1] - a community-managed list where authors of software can blacklist directories containing sensitive files or such files directly for all browsers implementing this feature. If I were to design such a list, it would include ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.config, ~/Library, ~/.{ba,z}sh{rc,_profile,_history}, ~/.m2, ~/.npm, ~/.npmrc, ~/.profile at the very least. Because users will get phished. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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