| ▲ | yardstick 5 hours ago |
| There used to be - probably still are - cameras that would digitally sign all their images. Used in crime scenes? Maybe we will end up seeing wider adoption of this, despite the privacy implications. Hackers attention then will focus (once again) on the certificate supply chain and crypto hardware. |
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| ▲ | ChrisMarshallNY 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] |
| I worked for a company that made these. We sold expensive software to the FBI. Took about six months for someone to crack the hash. |
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| ▲ | deepserket 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | What about a system that saves in some way the hash in a Blockchain, and if you, eg, XOR the hash of the video with the hash of the previous block you will "certainly" know that the video was created between the previous block and the block where the hash is saved in. That's a starting point. | | |
| ▲ | dindunuf 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | that does nothing to verify authenticity | | |
| ▲ | teravor an hour ago | parent [-] | | it does something, sometimes. it pushes the required fabrication timeline back. if it is mandated that every photo or video taken for the possible use in evidence is notarized at the time of acquisition, any fabrication would necessitate total premeditation. that is, the fabricators would need to know ahead of time what they were pursuing and what evidence they would need. this seems like a very costly barrier. for example, altering security footage would require some fantastical elements: a real-time system of ingesting real footage and altering it in real-time to slip it into the notarization pipeline within the error margins. requiring that any equipment that produces acceptable evidence stream commitment hashes in real-time to public append-only repositories would be an enormous step forward. |
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| ▲ | mcapodici 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | This sort of chain doesn't need PoW I take it, just a very secure police server to sign blocks. | | |
| ▲ | inigyou an hour ago | parent [-] | | And it couldn't be run by the police or any of their friends, since they're the adversary. |
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| ▲ | ChrisMarshallNY 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Might have a point. This was before blockchain. I suspect that the cops wouldn’t like the chain public, though. | | |
| ▲ | Terr_ 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | Like when people discuss voting, I believe a blockchain [0] is a terrible pitfall compared to a classic distributed database system of predefined nodes run by different organizations. For example, imagine a couple hundred predefined nodes run by different states, federal agencies, etc. An attacker altering the ledger would still require compromising an unreasonably large number of independent groups at once, and even then the rest would be able to clearly see that some unusual and suspicious event occurred. By limiting membership a bunch of problems simply vanish, like long-clearing times, wasting hardware on mining, vulnerability to foreign botnets, etc. [0] A blockchain is distinguished by its core requirement, from which a cascade complexity flows: Uncontrolled node membership. Don't be fooled by people pitching "private blockchain", its a contradiction in terms designed to rehabilitate hype, like "multi-sample Theranos test" or a bicycle as "Segway passively stabilized inline wheel model." |
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| ▲ | 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | [deleted] |
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| ▲ | EPWN3D 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | "Crack the hash"? Does this mean you were employing some novel hashing algorithm and relying on its secrecy? If so your employer were never serious about security in the first place. Hardware attestation is more or less a solved problem, and that solution does not involve secret algorithms. | | |
| ▲ | ChrisMarshallNY 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | Eh. It was some kind of hash of the image. I was not involved in that project, so can't tell you exactly how it worked, but the images were "signed," and someone figured out how to "re-sign" an altered image. I think it was a fairly well-known technique. |
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| ▲ | lostlogin 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Now sell them version 2. |
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| ▲ | aorloff 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-] |
| I imagine in this age of blockchains you could embed into a media file a signature that proved it was no older than the timestamp of when it occurred, the digital equivalent of a hostage-proof-of-life photo with a recent newspaper But I don't know of a cryptographic mechanism to ensure that a digital image is not more recent than a particular time |
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| ▲ | dspillett 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | > But I don't know of a cryptographic mechanism to ensure that a digital image is not more recent than a particular time Many (most?) blockchain mechanisms include a timestamp in each transaction on the chain, so while multiple records from the same owner prove little (the timestamps could be faked over a given period of time) the interaction with the wider network and the chain would give some confidence that the record happened between within a small amount of time. The other possibility, that doesn't require a chain with many independent active participants, is to have things signed by an external trusted authority. Submit a hash of the content and appropriate metadata to them, and have them sign it with a signing timestamp. I've considered abusing ACME certificates for document signing like that: the hash of content (or some signature based upon it) becomes the subdomain to sign¹ and you get a certificate that even after expiry is evidence that the CA saw that value at the signing timestamp. Note of the signing will also be in the public certificate transparency log. This wouldn't, on its own, prove anything about the authenticity of the content, that could have been doctored before signing, but it does prove that the content+metadata existed at that time (so might be more useful in copyright claim type cases, or agreed contract situations where all parties have signed the content and the signatures are included in the metadata, than for proving authenticity). ---------------- [1] based64²-ed with non-alphanumeric characters removed and truncated³ to fit or split, so acodha3sf7whsrhtqestkabtx0b4bbhyveee0ajnrpqcuxrjjvmhsujgcex.domain.tld or acodha3sf7whsrhtqestkabtx0b4bbhyveee0ajnrpqcuxrjjvmhsujgcex.w5jmmkpmyfgshx2jecsfordpnq.domain.tld [2] names not being case-sensitive drops some of the entropy, if that is a concern use a 32-bits-per-character encoding instead and have names twice as long | |
| ▲ | gcr 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Publish hash(image) on the blockchain at a verifiable time, then publish the image itself. The image contains the previous block’s hash. Wouldn’t this establish both a lower bound and an upper bound on the time the image could have been produced? | |
| ▲ | 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | [deleted] | |
| ▲ | __del__ 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | wouldn't that be a hash of the image signed by a trusted entity and stored on a chain? maybe i'm overlooking why this doesn't work | |
| ▲ | catlikesshrimp 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Interesting, There aren't any newspapers left in my country, neither printed nor not printed. The closest you can find is the weekly advertising booklet here and there. Which is irrelevant now because a computer can either stich new content to an old picture, or entirely producing a custom picture. That would be a use case for a block chain. But I still don't understand how you are securing the integrity of the validity of the certificate stating the authenticity of the media. I only understand you are stamping media with a "at least as old as [timestamp] | | |
| ▲ | 3eb7988a1663 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | If you want to prove that "happened at or after this timestamp" you can use a randomness beacon. NIST[0] and others publish a random number every N minutes. Embed that (or a combination) of those seeds to prove that you observed this value. This does not work for the harder problem of proving an event happened before a timestamp. [0] https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/interoperable-randomness-beac... | |
| ▲ | appaj 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Which country no longer has newspapers? |
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