That is a terrible way to run a package repo in this day and age.

Maintainers need to have some level of vetting, and should own a repo or three for a while to establish a track record, before they get to blast out contributions to 100 of them without any review.

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Gormo an hour ago | parent [-]

AUR isn't a package repo. It's a collection of user-contributed PKGBUILD scripts, to make building packages from upstream source distributions more convenient. It's not meant to be treated like an official repo of binary packages.

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naturalmovement 11 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

> AUR isn't a package repo.

What does the 'R' in AUR stand for? Rutabaga?

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dualvariable an hour ago | parent | prev [-]

That's a semantic detail based on the choice of build from source over binary distribution.

This is also a terrible way to run a package build system in this day and age as well, if you like. I feel exactly the same way about it, and when I wrote that I understood what it was, so I didn't need that helpful correction (I first used the FreeBSD ports system sometime around the turn of the millennia).

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embedding-shape an hour ago | parent [-]

> That's a semantic detail based on the choice of build from source over binary distribution.

It's not, AUR is more like GitHub, anyone can upload content there, not like a proper repository where things are reviewed, verified and cared for.

You're complaining about "curl https://random-website.com | bash" being "a semantic detail" while it's a major difference in how much trust you can put into it. If you don't trust random-website.com, you shouldn't trust AUR packages. But very different from BSD Ports or Arch's official repositories.

	▲	dualvariable 19 minutes ago \| parent [-]
		GitHub doesn't allow me to put up my old repos for adoption by any old rando, or to allow randos to request to take over my repos if I don't respond for 2 weeks. GitHub also actually protects against repojacking and tombstones username/reponame combinations (that exceed a certain minimum popularity) and never lets anyone ever use them again. The utility of AUR is also really based around being able to reuse the same repo without having to re-vet every single time. This kind of attack, that forces you to re-vet on every single upgrade so that trust inherently can't be established, is also not GitHub's model at all. And go has a software package manager that heavily uses GH for distribution, and is arguably more VCS decentralized, but isn't vulnerable to this kind of attack, because it inherts GH's threat model, and doesn't implement the kind of choices that AUR decided to deliberately build into their system.