>`rua` and other similar CLIs make it really easy to review the packages before installing them from AUR too, and if you are doing banking on the same computer, you really have no excuse not to review the software you depend on.

What review should users do?

It appears that, in some cases, these were adding npm as a dependency and installing atomic-lockfile, and in others, these were adding bun and installing js-digest. This was a mass attack against mostly low-use/orphaned/etc packages where maintainership was taken over or a different user uploaded a new version (itself a very simple, low-notice, low-oversight process), and many of the packages clearly had no connection to Node.js at all, so a user who knew enough about each package, and knew what npm was, might notice the oddity in the package, if they reviewed every line of the PKGBUILD, then reviewed the install scripts.

But legitimate AUR packages for packages connected to Node.js also use npm, for example, and at times, use npm install. A user would have to be familiar enough with Archlinux's build system to understand the difference between each part (eg, build() vs install scripts). They'd have to review every PKGBUILD, every install script, and every patch of every AUR package they install. For packages that actually do use npm/bun, they'd have to be familiar enough to know what uses were legitimate and what uses were not, and might have to be up to date on compromised dependencies. And this is still considering a mass attack that was not particularly hidden. Attacks could be made much harder to find.

Asking a user to safely review an AUR package essentially seems like it is asking them to fully understand not just the build process, and programming language, of the upstream package, but also all details of Archlinux's build system. They need to learn how to do this with, as far as I can tell, no real guidance: AUR itself, and the wiki's page on it, just warn that users should carefully review the PKGBUILD and install scripts, without giving any substantial guidance on what to look for or how to review anything. The warnings feel much more like liability-reduction than an attempt to be helpful.

At that point, what is AUR actually offering that installing the upstream package isn't? It feels like the suggested 'safe' way of using AUR would make it just as much work for the user, and require just as much knowledge, as either installing the upstream directly, or even making a package for it.

There is perhaps some room for LLM analysis here: Opus 4.8, Kimi latest, and even Qwen3.6 27B quickly catch at least the current round of malicious packages in my tests. But a motivated attacker could make that more difficult, or dangerous. And a user could also just have those models install the upstream package, with less risk. If they want to use pacman for management, they could likely even have those LLMs generate a package, with less risk.

Not all tools are made for inexperienced people. Not everything is idiot proof. This is OK!

In my experience using the AUR:

1. when you first install the package you can read the build script (and you should). These are in a very standard structure, and if the one you are reading is weird and complicated consider not installing it. No one is forcing you to. Almost every build script I read just downloads a build from a tagged github release.

2. when you get an upgrade you are shown the diff. For almost every AUR package I use this is literally just changing the $VERSION variable and the subsequent $HASH of the download. It is trivial to see if anything (in the AUR script) is happening that is sneaky.

It's really not that scary. And if it's considered scary, there are literally dozens of other linux distros (not to mention Windows or MacOS) you could be using instead.

> What review should users do?

The same sort of review you'd do if a stranger sends over a project and says "compile and run this" and you actually want whatever it's supposed to do, so you start looking through it.

> It appears that, in some cases, these were adding npm as a dependency and installing atomic-lockfile, and in others, these were adding bun and installing js-digest

That's very suspicious if the package you're about to install doesn't seem to actually need those things. Since "AUR === random strangers on the internet with zero trust", then you need to pay attention to those sort of things.

> Asking a user to safely review an AUR package essentially seems like it is asking them to fully understand not just the build process, and programming language, of the upstream package, but also all details of Archlinux's build system.

Yes, indeed. Same as if you come across a random C++ project on GitHub with 2 stars, do you just pull down the source and compile willy-nilly? Probably not, you carefully inspect it can actually do what you want, how it does it, and so on. AUR is basically like GitHub in this case, zero peer-reviews and users fully responsible for whatever they install.

> At that point, what is AUR actually offering that installing the upstream package isn't?

PKGBUILDs, so you don't have to write them yourself. Not more, not less, just a central place for random strangers to share PKGBUILDs that may or may not work for others.

> At that point, what is AUR actually offering that installing the upstream package isn't?

It produces package files that pacman can use. Sure, you can curl|sh or whatever, but that's a good way to litter stuff all over that you can't track or uninstall cleanly.