| > Do you disagree with the assumption that cells are machines? They seem pretty machine-like to me.
You just said it: they are machine-like. No, cells aren't machines for two reasons:
1) machines, by definition, are artifacts created by human beings.
2) The nature of a living organism is completely different from that of 'machines'. (even if we a re able to replicate a cell in a lab, like the group from Craig Venter did). Autopoiesis being one very big difference, another being emergence-within-the-environment (life) vs design-conditioned-by-will (machines) > ... if the mind is an emergent phenomenon from machines (cells) then it seems quite likely that a mind could emerge from other, different machines.
Since cells cannot be defined as machines, the argument about mind emerging from machines does not hold. |
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| ▲ | derektank 11 days ago | parent | next [-] | | Hmmm, well let’s take it one step lower. What do you think of organelles such as ribosomes? Do you disagree with the assumption that those are machines? They seem directly analogous to the jacquard loom or a CNC machine to me. | | |
| ▲ | gyomu 11 days ago | parent [-] | | Yes again, ribosomes have nothing in common with machines, that are built and designed by humans. The ball is in your camp to provide solid reasons to believe why they should be grouped together, when one is a deeply complex interrelated dynamic system (in fact, arguably the most complex system we know of) evolved bottom up over billions of years that we only very partially understand and cannot fully explain or document, and the other something entirely planned, designed, and produced by humans in which every component is finite and accounted for. The argument boils down to “well the vibes kind of match to my taste, and it’s the best analogy I have in my analogy toolkit”, which is just not serious reasoning. | | |
| ▲ | derektank 11 days ago | parent [-] | | I think ribosomes have a lot in common with machines. They use energy to accomplish a task (assembles proteins). This would seem to put them in the same category as artificial molecular machines like rotaxanes. I don’t think there’s a huge gap in our understanding of how either systems identically functions independently. Yes, ribosomes exist as part of a larger context, but they can be removed from that context pretty easily and understood as individual molecules quite extensively. In your view, can machines even exist that haven’t been created by people, definitionally? I, personally, don’t see the relevance of intent but that seems to be the only distinguishing factor here. |
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| ▲ | wat10000 11 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | The assertion is not that cells are machines built by humans (obviously false), merely that they are machines. Which they pretty clearly are, unless you assume the supernatural. | | |
| ▲ | f_klem 11 days ago | parent [-] | | There is no need to assume the supernatural.
They are machines based on what?
By definition, a machine is something build by humans, or any intelligent life form (because we extend the definition from our own experience as self defined 'intelligent life forms').
Living organisms and machines do share traits under our current frame of reference in modern science. But that doesn't mean cells are machines. The right framing would be 'cells exhibit behavior and certain internal relations that we can conceptualize them as machines', which is different from 'cells are machines'. | | |
| ▲ | wat10000 11 days ago | parent [-] | | By what definition? Anyway, seems like an argument over said definitions rather than the underlying characteristics. The relevant question is whether they're purely physical objects behaving according to rules, which is being described as "machine," or whether there is something beyond that. Current understanding is contradictory: all indications are that cells and bodies are purely physical objects, except that there is this phenomenon of subjective experience which doesn't fit with that at all. | | |
| ▲ | f_klem 11 days ago | parent | next [-] | | > By what definition? We have this definition from the history of western languages, the history of western philosophy, and works by Lewis Mumford and Franz Reuleaux, among others authors. > The relevant question is whether they're purely physical objects behaving according to rules, which is being described as "machine," or whether there is something beyond that. Current understanding is contradictory: all indications are that cells and bodies are purely physical objects, except that there is this phenomenon of subjective experience which doesn't fit with that at all. Then you would say that you dog broke (died), or that the vet fixed your cat (cured). Which by all means we might speak that way, but surely you would notice that it is not accurate. Saying that a living organism is just a machine because it is a physical object behaving according to rules is like saying that a beautifully built house is just a bunch of bricks layed in rows and something on top. But assuming that we say 'purely physical objects behaving according to rules' are machines, then: 1) there is no difference between you, your dog, your fridge and the snail in you garden
2) It would be semantically valid in all languages to say 'my dog broke' instead of it died, 'i got fixed' instead of 'the doctor cured me'
3) Machines vary in complexity and we would still have 'degrees of complexity' regarding machines (human bodies being the most complex, perhaps, toasters being fairly simple), but fundamentally, all of them would follow the same rules for 'fixing', 'breaking' and 'repairing'. Which is not the case.
4) You would have to come up with some kind of theology regarding how we were built. There is no evidence that we have been 'built', quite the contrary. And most probably there are quite more reasons not to regard machines as living organisms nor living organisms as machines. | |
| ▲ | gyomu 10 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | If your definition of machine is "purely physical object behaving according to rules"[0], then one could argue that everything in the universe is a machine, which is not a very useful definition. [0] where I assume you mean rules = "laws of physics", because if we were to choose the more conventional definition of rule = "an accepted principle or instruction that states the way things are or should be done", then your own definition doesn't apply to cells or other biological entities | | |
| ▲ | wat10000 10 days ago | parent [-] | | I didn’t say that was my definition, I said that was the actual important question here. |
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| ▲ | NiloCK 11 days ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | replication: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quine_(computing) autonomous replication: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer_worm nb that writing your own quine remains in general terms a fun and challenging exercise in many programming languages, but not python. | | |
| ▲ | gyomu 11 days ago | parent [-] | | We are talking about physical replication, please let me know when a computer worm can turn my laptop into 2 laptops Otherwise you’re just arguing that Sims are totally alive because Sims can make baby Sims. |
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| ▲ | Sharlin 11 days ago | parent | prev [-] | | What exactly is there about cells that's inconceivable to replicate or synthetize? "I cannot conceive it" is a fallacy, an argument from incredulity. Trying to disguise it by draping it in the passive voice does not change that fact. | | |
| ▲ | f_klem 11 days ago | parent [-] | | Nothing. It is just that they are so incredibly complex, that after +100 years of research we still don't know how they work or why.
Will there be a time when we finally understand them 100% and could replicate them? Could be. That does not make them machines in any case, and the fallacy of thinking that mind/consciousness can emerge from machines will still be there. |
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