> resolved this well enough. Opinions?

Not at all resolved. If anything it is worse than before as we begin to understand it better, and now there are different versions of it that cover representation, relevance, epistemics. Pivoting "away" from logic just relocates it again. Arguably the whole challenge of neurosymbolics is (still) getting a persistent sidecar for logic bolted onto something like a language model. We actually have fairly decent autoformalizers (!!) and we still can't make that work very well in general. From one perspective, the frame problem is pretty closely related to the "binding problem", and relevance is central to both. We have good pure logics for relevance and epistemics too, but can't get language models to drive them very well, and language models alone are terrible at trying to do this sort of thing natively (see distractor sensitivity). Neurosymbolics probably is the key, but until there's more traffic between old-school and new we're facing the same old problems.

When/if there's real progress.. I think we'd know. It may or may not be AGI-complete but the improvements for things like long-horizon and truly out-of-distribution planning would probably be immediate, obvious, and jaw dropping

Heh. Reminds me of one of Lewis Carroll's sylogisms:

    Premise A: "No one, who means to go by the train and cannot get a conveyance, and has not enough time to walk to the station, can do without running";

    Premise B: "This party of tourists mean to go by the train and cannot get a conveyance, but they have plenty of time to walk to the station".

    Does the conclusion "This party of tourists need not run" hold?

[Here is another opportunity, gentle Reader, for playing a trick on your innocent friend. Put the proposed Syllogism before him, and ask him what he thinks of the Conclusion.

He will reply “Why, it’s perfectly correct, of course! And if your precious Logic-book tells you it isn’t, don’t believe it! You don’t mean to tell me those tourists need to run? If I were one of them, and knew the Premisses to be true, I should be quite clear that I needn’t run—and I should walk!”

And you will reply “But suppose there was a mad bull behind you?”

And then your innocent friend will say “Hum! Ha! I must think that over a bit!”

You may then explain to him, as a convenient test of the soundness of a Syllogism, that, if circumstances can be invented which, without interfering with the truth of the Premisses, would make the Conclusion false, the Syllogism must be unsound.]