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spullara 5 hours ago

recovery is always the weakest link in any authentication system

acdha 5 hours ago | parent | next [-]

This is not wrong but what’s really missing is cost: Meta did this so they can avoid paying people to do it. Lots of companies follow that decay spiral: your bank could shut phishers down cold by requiring wire transfers to be authorized in person but they don’t want to pay staff or risk you being upset by a transaction taking an extra hour so they don’t.

Imagine an alternate universe where big tech companies worked with various trustworthy third-parties where something like this would generate a challenge you could take to your local notary, post office, library, police station, etc. where someone would check ID before approving it. How many phishing attacks would be prevented annually by a physical presence check?

dylan604 4 hours ago | parent | next [-]

> your bank could shut phishers down cold by requiring wire transfers to be authorized in person but they don’t want to pay staff or risk you being upset by a transaction taking an extra hour so they don’t.

Isn't this essentially what just recently happened to the Pope? Then there were people here doing the rest of your comment for him saying how egregious it was for them to ask for an in person authorization. It sounded like all he was trying to do was update his address, but changing your address from one in Chicago to one in a European country absolutely sounds like something a phisher would be trying to do.

throwaway85825 4 hours ago | parent [-]

Its perfectly acceptable for a security model to make things difficult for extreme edge cases like the pope. After all if the situation warrants it such rare events can always be escalated.

spullara 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

for a while facebook had the ability to recover your account by having them ask several of your friends if the recovery was legitimate but it was turned off. my guess is that not enough people added trusted contacts to bother running it.

https://www.theverge.com/2013/5/2/4292744/facebook-trusted-c...

parable 4 hours ago | parent [-]

I actually quite like this solution. Beats asking users to add a "recovery selfie" (something Meta actually does now) - I'd rather choose 3 of my friends and have them approve some notification in-app. Seems like better UX and preserves privacy a slight bit more, but we all know Meta's not in the privacy business.

spullara 29 minutes ago | parent [-]

honestly I can't think of a better solution that would require a far more coordinated attack to pull off. it should work on any system where trusted folks are likely to have accounts.

3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]
[deleted]
ronsor 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

The amount of hassle involved with regular physical checks is why it's not implemented, regardless of attack prevention.

The cost of hiring a person is part of it but not really the core reason. People were sold on the Internet with "you can do things online conveniently" and reintroducing the need to physically go somewhere negates that angle entirely.

acdha 2 hours ago | parent | next [-]

To be clear, I was thinking cost as more than just payroll - e.g. my bank can do this because they have paid for a branch near my house, Facebook does not - but another way to look at it is that many of the costs due to errors have been shifted to the user.

I do think friction causes a reflexive resistance to the idea but I think that might be an overreaction. This is a rare thing people should be doing no more than a few times in their life.

anonymars 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

> People were sold on the Internet with "you can do things online conveniently" and reintroducing the need to physically go somewhere negates that angle entirely

But how often does one need to do recovery procedures like this?

How much less convenient is it for everyone else to be at risk of their account being taken over?

econ 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

Then you get trusted parties selling account access. Even if you remove them for a single false positive they will do it. A bit like a % packages "vanishing".

The least terrible seem digital id.

acdha 2 hours ago | parent [-]

> Then you get trusted parties selling account access

How many bank tellers or USPS employees do that, though? It’s possible but quite rare because people know they’ll be running a big risk of being caught and no individual transaction is worth that much.

SoftTalker 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

It's a tough problem, because people forget passwords, change phones, lose access to 2FA devices, but still need to use their accounts.

StilesCrisis 4 hours ago | parent | next [-]

It's worse than "forgetting." Having seen older folks just set up new accounts for a move, they make zero attempt to even try to keep them! Oh, the phone company needs a login/pass? Just type in anything, don't write it down. If something goes wrong, they're going to call in anyway, not use the website.

dpark 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

I had to go through the account recovery on my Facebook account once and the proof they demanded was that I match a bunch of pictures of friends to their names. I think it took 3 tries over multiple days to actually get it unlocked because it turns out I such really remember a lot of the people I met 20 years ago and friended on Facebook.

I don’t recall why I had to go through this song and dance. Very plausibly the account was still associated with an old school address that I could no longer access. So yeah, account recovery is hard. How do you prove someone owns an account when they’ve lost the things they are supposed to use to prove ownership?

toomuchtodo 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

I manage customer identity and access management ("CIAM") for a financial services firm. Passkeys are primary, recovery can be performed by providing a government credential remotely (which costs us ~$2-3 per recovery). I do not think it is hard, based on what we have built and spent to enable these capabilities. NIST Special Publication NIST SP 800-63 Digital Identity Guidelines is a helpful resource on this topic.

https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/

I think Meta just does not care if they're enabling AI attack surface and vulnerabilities into these customer journeys. It's...certainly a choice, versus deterministic journeys with hard guardrails. They could make different choices.

toast0 4 hours ago | parent | next [-]

> recovery can be performed by providing a government credential remotely

That only works because you presumably do KYC when you open accounts, so you have an identity to match to. Most internet accounts don't do real KYC, so a government credential doesn't really work for recovery --- they didn't know who you were, so proving who you are doesn't help anything.

That doesn't mean that letting anyone sweet talk support or an AI into taking over an account is acceptable, of course.

toomuchtodo 4 hours ago | parent [-]

It's a fair point, and can be solved for as part of the "Verified" offerings Meta offers. This binds IRL identity to the digital identity at verification for future identity assurance step up (including if and when recovery is required). Failing that, TOTP, SMS, and even mailing an OTP to a mailing address remain low friction auth factors (with, of course, various levels of security).

My point is that while this is not easy, there are obvious very bad ways to implement this that should not be done (chatbot or other generative AI interface vulnerable to the usual suspects of AI inherent attack surface). Don't build the bad way, the right away is known and straightforward.

macintux 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

I’d wager your range of tech literacy/capabilities for your firm is much narrower than big tech.

econ 4 hours ago | parent | next [-]

Someone gained access to a Instagram account (belonging to a business by the same name) connected to a fb account (by the same name) that they still had access to. The only thing fb could do was terminate the Instagram for impersonation.

It's an impressive level of incompetence.

toomuchtodo 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

Range != value, depending on use case. Doing more poorly does not make something better. Our customer identity capabilities are very close to login.gov (we don't have to support hundreds of agency customers and common access cards), and if its good enough for ~342M Americans, its good enough for our customer base.

Broadly speaking, work for the sake of work is not valuable work. Show me outcomes for resources and time invested, and compare accordingly. Value is, again broadly speaking (there is always nuance), what you deliver. If you bring me an AI solution for a high risk high value customer journey, data flow, or code path, that is an anti pattern. If you, as a colleague or a stakeholder, put forth that we must use AI in situations that require a high degree of determinism (due to potential high cost failure modes), you will need to prove this extraordinary claim with evidence.

Choose Boring Technology - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9291215 - March 2015 (212 comments) ["Am I using this project as an excuse to learn some new technology, or am I trying to solve a problem?"]

I get paid to manage risk efficiently, including being measured on time and budget spent against the success criteria, ymmv; my comp and budget is not dependent on how much AI I shove into security systems. "What am I optimizing for?"

Amazon scraps AI leaderboard to stop workers chasing usage scores - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48315583 - May 2026 (19 comments)

fn-mote 3 hours ago | parent [-]

> [login.gov] if its good enough for ~342M Americans

I am very curious about the actual number of users of login.gov.

I am a US citizen and my experience was … negative to the point of actively avoiding it.

toomuchtodo 2 hours ago | parent [-]

> I am very curious about the actual number of users of login.gov.

"Login.gov has surpassed 100 million registered user accounts. The platform facilitates over 300 million sign-ins annually and sees more than 10 million monthly active users, acting as a secure single sign-on solution across nearly 50 federal, state, and local agencies."

https://www.login.gov/partners/faq/

(It is the primary identity provider for Social Security Administration, IRS will eventually adopt it [1])

[1] IRS to adopt Login.gov as user authentication tool - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30430851 - February 2022 (182 comments)

mr_mitm 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

It's a hard problem. How do you prove you own an account if you lost all proof of ownership? Especially so if an account was never tied to your real name, in which case you could at least rely on government ids.

throwaway85825 3 hours ago | parent [-]

Simple, you don't. This is all going to seem quaint in a few years when old accounts started getting deleted for inactivity.

jgalt212 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

fair enough, but what's the actual point of 2FA if it's so easy to override?

4 hours ago | parent | next [-]
[deleted]
spullara 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

the alternative is people losing their accounts and people aren't willing to allow that. i do think that apple does this a little better where they try everything to contact you in every way they know and it takes a week to get access. at a minimum to change your email it should require a week of waiting to see if the user can access the original mail to the hand off.

recursive 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

In some cases, checkbox-compliance with customer requirements.

UltraSane 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

It depends. Some like AWS take it deadly seriously and it takes a long time to recover root access to an account.