> Changing the system means removing the potential for abuse of power, not punishing abuse of power after the fact.

At a certain point, punishing abuse of power after the fact is the only way to discourage the potential abuse of power. Like there is nothing that actually stops you or me from going and kidnapping someone. And that same dynamic applies to someone who happens to also be a sheriff who controls a jail due to his employment. There is no magic wand for the system to wave that makes it so that the individuals employed by that system can't simply break the law.

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ikeboy 2 hours ago | parent [-]

The warrant here was approved by a magistrate judge, and I would suggest making the process for approval more robust to reduce this kind of abuse.

Personal civil liability and firing can also help.

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mindslight 2 hours ago | parent [-]

I don't think magistrates rule on questions of law (maybe you were implying this, but maybe not). But in general the whole legal/justice system is basically blind to the harm it itself causes, so I don't think an actual judge looking at the merits of a warrant would be terribly adversarial to a sheriff either - they work together all the time, and most of the warrants presented by the sheriff are legitimate.

I do agree with you in general that we should aim to split system functions between multiple people. But this merely raises the bar, it doesn't make corrupt actions impossible. Which means we should be focusing on both avenues of reform, rather than emphasizing one to downplay another. Especially as when you do this, the entrenched system seems to takes advantage of the downplaying while resisting the solution being emphasized.

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ikeboy 2 hours ago | parent [-]

Magistrates are supposed to verify that the warrant contains probable cause and reject ones that don't.

You could make the system more adversarial at that point, although I think enforcing bail hearings where a public defender can argue would help in this and many other cases.

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mindslight an hour ago | parent [-]

Shooting from the hip, I'd think a properly adversarial/just process would be something like a public defender (or other attorney of the person's choosing) who is paid out of government funds. Then there should probably be different classes of warrants, with the lowest class being something like the person is notified and able to choose their representation to challenge the warrant before it's even issued (presumably non-violent, no flight risk, etc), with escalating classes based on those factors.

But even then, abuse of that classification is something that could routinely happen and would need to be punished post-facto. Imagine the same sheriff looking to perform the same retaliation, so he checks all the boxes for a no-notice no-knock warrant that still results in an arrest with a weekend in jail. Which is why my main point is that we shouldn't argue against one avenue of reform with the goal of emphasizing a different one.

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ikeboy an hour ago | parent [-]

My concern is that new crimes will be weaponized.

	▲	mindslight 15 minutes ago \| parent [-]
		As opposed to the current status quo where illegal actions of public officials against otherwise-uninvolved private citizens go unpunished? I don't find this argument compelling, as it would at least limit the blast radius to people who get involved in public office. And once again there isn't much that can be done about corrupt public officials unjustly prosecuting/persecuting former officials as it comes down to that same human problem rather than a system problem. The persecutions of Comey and James rely on a post-truth electorate that doesn't care, and who chose to reelect a destructive tyrant who hates our American values merely to stick a fork in the eye of "the elites". And while we can also talk about ways of reforming the system to prevent that (eg Constitutional amendment that explicitly divides power amongst independent agencies), I don't think it has much bearing on how we should be drawing legal lines in the sand to constrain public officials.