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himata4113 5 hours ago

Expanding on gentoo's recommendations:

I wonder if we should just universally accept that live patching should become part of the linux kernel? An automatic job that updates (much like some system packages in some distros) that installs (signed) live patches from upstream? Of course we would run into a problem where a malicious patch can now be distributed reliably to hundreds of thousands of machines, but we already have that at a lower level with normal application updates.

Canonical has thus far proved that it can be safe, but they're also a massive organization that is locking this feature for $200/yr for any commercial use.

It would be neat if such patches could retroactively replace tagged functions that have identical sematics so that means it would automatically get backported without extra effort from the maintainers.

elevation an hour ago | parent | next [-]

> live patching should become part of the linux kernel

Services where uptime matters tend to be designed so they can tolerate the reboot of a single node for other reasons besides kernel maintenance. I can't imagine a situation where I can't tolerate the downtime of a reboot but I would be willing to risk the system locking up with brain surgery gone wrong.

toast0 40 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

> Services where uptime matters tend to be designed so they can tolerate the reboot of a single node for other reasons besides kernel maintenance. I can't imagine a situation where I can't tolerate the downtime of a reboot but I would be willing to risk the system locking up with brain surgery gone wrong.

I've run systems with live code updates for userland, and would have considered live kernel updates if it was reasonable on our systems.

The thing is you typically build your system to tolerate reboot or unscheduled stop of a single node. Scheduled stop is nicer, but systems sometimes lock up even when you're not doing risky behaviors, so you know.

But just because the system can tolerate a reboot or restart doesn't mean it's not disruptive. A lock up / etc during hot load is also disruptive, of course. But when you can push code without having to stop anything, with limited impact on users, it makes it easier and faster to do updates. You can use whatever rollout pattern you like to contain risk too; same as you would for an upgrade with restarts.

For us, we have servers with hundreds of thousands or millions of tcp connections from mobile clients. Restarting a server would make all those clients have to reconnect and connecting is expensive. Restarting all the servers would result in many clients reconnecting several times. It was better to avoid it when possible.

PunchyHamster an hour ago | parent | prev [-]

We've used ksplice for good amount of years (till bought by Oracle and they stopped publishing patches for other Linux distros) and all in all it was very stable technology 10 years ago

> I can't imagine a situation where I can't tolerate the downtime of a reboot but I would be willing to risk the system locking up with brain surgery gone wrong.

Because you haven't worked at that level in organization. Doing restart in some case might involve paperwork with your client and maintenance window outside of working hours even if service is redundant. And some customers are fine with a little bit of downtime and don't want active/active level of redundancy but still insist of maintenance windows for any work like that.

Live patching makes that a whole lot easier

nine_k 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Why would the source of the patches be less trusted than the source of (updated) kernels? I expect it to be the same, your distro.

$200/year is peanuts for any commercial use worth the name. The problem, of course, is the whole non-free infrastructure it has to introduce.

I wonder when large and critical OSS projects will start to be seen as a public good they are, with large corporations willingly financing them because not doing so is bad PR.

graemep 4 hours ago | parent [-]

Public goods are not generally funded by large corporations.

c7b 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

After the npm supply chain attacks people suggested automating delays before installing updates, now we're talking about automating update delivery... I'm afraid there won't be any easy or quick fix after decades of treating security as an afterthought.

ordu 3 hours ago | parent [-]

Linux distros are not npm. It doesn't mean they are infallible to malicious actors, but I believe it is possible to make them infallible for some small set of packages at least.

Attacks are still possible, but if we look at xz backdoor attack[1] it was insanely complicated attack and it still failed. Its fail doesn't look promising, attack could succeed just the attacker was unlucky. Still it shows that the success is not guaranteed.

Theoretically npm can be improved in this way, if there were a separate "distro" for packaged, with dedicated maintainers for packages, who don't write code, just pull it from a mainstream and review it. It is not being done because of tragedy of commons, not because it is impossible.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XZ_Utils_backdoor

c7b an hour ago | parent | next [-]

Linux itself, major Linux distros, npm - none of these were designed with a security-first approach. Even the things that do help with security, like package maintenance or containerization, were more incidental to other primary goals like stability, reproducibility and so on rather than being born from a comprehensive security-first strategy. They could have been, but then things would have moved slower. They even exist, like Alpine, OpenBSD, RedoxOS, but the major ones, the ones we're talking about today, were the ones who moved faster and managed to take over. That's the fundamental issue I'm talking about, the mindset shift that would be required before we could even start the Herculean effort of rebuilding much of the existing stack with different architectures, in different languages and using different development models, always knowing that, in the past, the ones who moved fast and broke things instead tended to be the ones who succeeded.

ahartmetz 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

Whenever you read about an incredibly unlucky criminal, there's a chance that the unlucky event is a parallel construction to the classified real reason why they were caught. Not sure how exactly that would have worked in this case.

ordu 18 minutes ago | parent [-]

Yes, it could be. But it is a hypothetical that smells like a conspiracy theory. I wonder why you think it is a good idea to go for these hypotheticals?

Are you arguing that the system may be more resilient than it seems? Like, maybe there is a conspiracy working on security. And they keep themselves secret so attackers would be susceptible to under-appreciate the real level of security and make mistakes that inevitable would caught?

It seems like a over-stretched explanation, doesn't it. Care to explain yourself?

throwa356262 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

I dont belive in live patching unless you are AWS.

But I absolutely belive we should have a method for changing kernel configuration (e.g. kernel module blacklists) and syscall firewalls and alike.

edelbitter an hour ago | parent [-]

Easier: Do not start with a "allow all" configuration in the first place.

Maybe all of those userspace-work-done-in-kernel-because-muh-performance features should be restricted to (the "real") CAP_NET_ADMIN, unless positively enumerated as free-for-all-containers. And then subtract from that free-for-all list every time you learn that some kernel module in its currently available version cannot be trusted to do its own memory shuffling.

TacticalCoder 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

> I wonder if we should just universally accept that live patching should become part of the linux kernel?

I think we can learn many lessons from the recent SNAFUs before going all wild on auto-patching.

One lesson for example is that you shouldn't compile into the kernel modules that only about 0.00001% of all Linux installations out there are ever going to use.

Another lesson is that even if the modules are compiled, but not into the kernel, they should probably be blacklisted (preventing them from loading) by default and only removed from the blacklist by people who really know they'll need these rarely used modules.

We're way past the "but it needs to work on all cases": we're now into the "users installing our distro are getting hacked left and right" territory.

In any case I think many things can be done before Linux distros reproduce the "security" practices of the NPM ecosystem.

yjftsjthsd-h 4 hours ago | parent | next [-]

> we're now into the "users installing our distro are getting hacked left and right" territory

Are we? Are users actually getting hacked, or have they theoretically been exposed to problems that could allow local privileged escalation if exploited but that nobody's seen used in the wild?

(Edit: To be clear, I'm skeptical but this isn't a completely rhetorical question. If there are actual reports of these vulns causing problems, that would strongly incentivize a stronger response.)

bombcar 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

It used to be relatively standard even on the "big" distros to compile your own kernel if you needed something outside of the bog-standard. Modularization and all the related auto-detect auto-mod tools have resulted in most distros shipping a "works for almost everyone" kernel that has everything available as a module.

Perhaps we should tend toward the first.

yjftsjthsd-h 3 hours ago | parent [-]

It seems like a reasonable middle ground for most distros is to put things in kernel modules, but then package those modules into separate packages. If you don't need somedriver.ko, then you don't `apt install linux-driver-somedriver`; if you do need it, just install the package and it just works without needing to compile anything and you get automatic updates and everything.

For Gentoo, of course, "just recompile the kernel as desired" is more reasonable, though they have binary packages including for the kernel and I don't see why the same idea shouldn't work there.

Muromec 2 hours ago | parent | next [-]

>but then package those modules into separate packages. If you don't need somedriver.ko, then you don't `apt install linux-driver-somedriver

But I don't want to know what drivers I need and will need next. Tomorrow I could buy a different wifi module and then what? Spend 3 hours googling which rtl378326973268632aahaxhabt.ko to install? Thanks but no thanks.

patmorgan23 an hour ago | parent | next [-]

So why can't someone (probably the distro) build a utility that detects the hardware and installs the required kernal module?

We can have security and convenience.

tardedmeme an hour ago | parent | prev [-]

On older versions of Windows you used to get popups saying new hardware is detected, would you like to install the driver now?

PunchyHamster 42 minutes ago | parent | prev [-]

That's in generally available distro a huge PITA.

You can do blacklists easy enough if you want to, just add few lines of text into /etc.

I'd also like option for whitelisting, like whitelisting every single NIC driver is harmless enough coz they just won't be loaded, but anything that can be loaded by non-root userspace action should have option to be only loaded if it is on whitelist.

Tho all that is easily doable by just changing userspace AFAIK