The bigger issue is the tankers. The US Navy isn't going to be happy patrolling the strait sure, but even if they did they wouldn't be able to protect the tankers enough for it to make sense for tankers to take the risk.

The last time this happened the US opened the strait by accidentally shooting down an Iranian passenger plane after sinking a large chunk of Iranian navy. The Iranians assumed the US shoot the passenger plane down on intentionally as a war crime and assumed the US would was planning to escalate the conflict. This fear deterred further Iranian attacks on tankers.

This isn't going to work this time because the US started the war by performing of the most serious escalations possible, a decapitation strike against top Iranian leadership in a surprise attack using a diplomatic negotiation as cover. The US did this while the strait was open and Iran was considering a peace deal.

Threats of escalation are no longer effective at deterring Iran because Iran now believes the US will take such actions regardless of what Iran does. What does Iranian leadership have to lose by staying the course? Very little. On the other hand if Iranian leadership back down, they loose all their leverage, they look weak internally, they look weak externally and the US might decide to attack them out of the blue again.

This is why decapitation strikes are generally not done. They remove options and they undermine deterrence and paint belligerents into a corner.

I think "Iran was considering a peace deal" is a bit of a stretch here. Iran was stalling for time, not willing to give anything, and the Strait was indeed open. If they won't give anything now why should they have given anything before.

What does Iran still have to lose? Well, a lot. All their oil is exported through the strait that is now blockaded by the US. The regime while having survived so far and executing thousands of people is still vulnerable over the long term. Leaders can still be hit and potentially the penetrations that led to the success of the initial strikes is still there. Iran's energy sector which is what the regime needs to maintain control (pay salaries etc.) has still not been hit. Other strategic targets that are dual use have also still not been hit.

Iran is never going to capitulate, until it capitulates. Their rhetoric is going to remain that the US has no more levers and can't change anything, because admitting otherwise invites those levers to be engaged. There is some truth to certain individuals likely willing to pay a large price but it's far from clear how deep and wide that extends and what is the tipping point. It is possible that Iran can withstand an oil blockade and even a resumption of air strikes for a very long time but it's also possible they can't. I can't tell and I doubt many people can. There are analysts and various experts with all sorts of opinions.

EDIT: Some of you may remember the Iraqi rhetoric before the US invasion. Then when the US attacked Iraq it crumbled like a paper tiger. The US lost 139 people or so (the coalition lost a bit more) to take Iraq and the Iraqi army largely surrendered or ran away. Assad's huge army with tanks and fighter jets, supported by Russia, collapsed from a bunch of ragtag ex-ISIS guys on Toyotas. The Iranian regime is a lot weaker than what you'd think by listening to them talk because any projection of weakness is the end of them. Ofcourse the US Iraqi invasion ended up very badly after this tactical success and that's the actual problem. Defeating Iran on the battlefield - not so much.

On a much smaller scale, this is advice I give to just about everyone: If your decisions won't affect how they treat you, then just do what you want. The fact that they won't like it doesn't matter, they didn't like you before.

> This is why decapitation strikes are generally not done. They remove options and they undermine deterrence and paint belligerents into a corner.

You don't think autocrats have a strong incentive to not die?