Utterly asinine article that doesn't understand its own subject matter.

Agreed.

> Then he declared that there is another distinct problem — why the brain’s behavior is accompanied by experience at all — which he christened the “hard” problem of consciousness.

This is what the article is positioned against.

> We have souls. We have an inner self. We can treat ourselves as transcendental subjects in the Kantian sense.

Isn't this an equivalent declaration? I understand the desire to cling to such ideas (as the article itself propounds), but if you don't understand the underlying laws to a high enough degree I consider this equivalent to ancient Greeks sitting around saying "there is a double of our soul inside the mirror, WE HAVE SEEN IT". We know today there is absolutely nothing at all "inside" that mirror. How do we know all this qualia isn't just some sort of illusion, that we ACTUALLY experience something?

Unfortunately, this article puts forth an intriguing promise and then completely fails to deliver.

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smokedetector1 2 hours ago | parent [-]

> How do we know all this qualia isn't just some sort of illusion, that we ACTUALLY experience something?

I know what it means to have an experience that is illusory. For example, a mirage, or a drug-induced hallucination.

What doesn’t make sense to me is how it’s possible for it to be an illusion that anything is being experienced at all. An illusion is a type of experience, isn’t it? If the experience is illusory, then who/what is being deceived?

(This is basically just Descartes “I think therefore I am”)

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argee an hour ago | parent [-]

> What doesn’t make sense to me is how it’s possible for it to be an illusion that anything is being experienced at all.

It might not make sense to you now, but that's because of what we know or what we think we know, today (hence my ancient Greeks analogue). Look at the Gazzaniga effect, people seamlessly make up an "experience" narrative out of absolutely nothing. Whatever experience was claimed there probably didn't exist prior to the point of questioning, and then was wholly manufactured. Thus, that particular experience was a fabrication.

> If the experience is illusory, then who/what is being deceived?

Why does there need to be a who/what being deceived for something to be an illusion? A mirror functions regardless of whether someone is there to pretend there is a soul in it.

We come from a race that took two thousand years (after it was first proposed) to accept the brain as the seat of the mind, over the heart — just because the heart physically reacts in times of emotion, while the brain remains inert.

Whatever the truth is, humanity probably won't know it until enough generations of the old guard indoctrinated in the old ideas have passed on.

	▲	smokedetector1 an hour ago \| parent [-]
		Sorry, who make up an experience narrative?

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Domenic_S 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

> I fail to make sense of the claim that there is such an “explanatory gap.” It regards what we would understand if we were to understand something that we currently do not understand. Forgive the muddled question, but: How can we know now what we would understand if we were to understand something we do not currently understand?

Rhetorical nonsense. If I'm a student about to take geometry for the first time, I can certainly have a sense of what I'll understand when I "understand something [I] do not currently understand".

The explanatory gap, IIUC, is rather simple: we can't explain why neurons firing results in us feeling/experiencing the world. This doesn't seem controversial to me.