> It does significantly lower the bars for identifying you though, but the requirements are still high

If you squint a bit, it looks a lot like a "Nobody But US" (NOBUS[1]) scheme. A few more identifying bits could tip the scale for party that has a whole host of other bits on a list of suspects, without being useful to most other people.

1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NOBUS

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linkregister 2 hours ago | parent | next [-]

Then why complicate it by being publicly insecure? If Mullvad were wanting to defeat anonymity, they could simply log the traffic metadata while falsely advertising they aren't.

Their ads on San Francisco's public transit are good.

	▲	hackinthebochs an hour ago \| parent \| next [-]
		Good VPNs tout the fact that they had nothing to give in response to a subpoena, or that there was nothing a law enforcement agency to find when they seized a server. For mullvad to be effective as a honey pot it needs to survive these events with its reputation in tact.
	▲	raverbashing 2 hours ago \| parent \| prev [-]
		"public insecure" JFC Security is always a balance. Always AI is showing that everything has a weak spot (wondering where are the "I don't make mistakes with C" now people are - but that's for another discussion) There's another commenter mentioning this makes sense because exactly it avoids them keeping information on which customer is matched to which server. You know, one of the things you don't want to log Could it be done better? Probably. Here's a better idea, logging off is 100% safe Meanwhile 99% of the normies will go for NordVPN

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illiac786 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

You definitely need glasses then.

Let me specify: The user must have entered his data on one site which the attacker has control of. That is a high bar still.

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UqWBcuFx6NV4r 2 hours ago | parent [-]

it really isn’t.

	▲	illiac786 2 hours ago \| parent [-]
		Examples?