| ▲ | RhysU 5 hours ago | ||||||||||||||||||||||
> The New York and California pension systems would become holders of SpaceX shares through their passive allocations if the company is admitted to major U.S. stock indexes. If they have discretion, these pensions can replicate the S&P500 minus SpaceX if they don't like SpaceX's governance. If they're forced to passively hold precisely the S&P500 then shaddup and stop active managing. Next. | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| ▲ | bell-cot 5 hours ago | parent [-] | ||||||||||||||||||||||
> If they have discretion... True. But doing so would be a fair amount (by index standards) of overhead and hassle. Plus they'd get endless complaints any time the S&P500 was outperforming the "S&P 499" that they were using. Plus they'd put themselves in the crosshairs of a whole range of activists who wanted them to switch to an "S&P 498", or ...497, or ... - by excluding various other companies the activists didn't like. > If they're forced to passively hold... Their responsibility is managing their pension funds in the interests of their state, and their current & future retirees. Not pious adherence to passive indexing canon. Their calculus here might be to throw a small bone to the anti-Musk activists who are currently bothering them, while acquiring some "we tried!" butt-coverage for whenever Musk really goes off the rails. (And, obviously, trying to discourage other companies from using such control structures.) | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| |||||||||||||||||||||||