The docker compose stack for the applications is spun up on the host. The agents have access to the docker socket which means they can talk to docker from inside their sandbox and spin up new sibling containers on the host. Yolobox isn’t designed for full isolation- just accidental commands you wouldn’t want to run on the host, and a convenient way of giving agents a customizable environment they control.

Early on in development I tried to harden the container to prevent deliberate escapes by the agent. This was a waste of time as the agents just kept finding more and more exploits when I asked them to try and break out.

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CodesInChaos 16 hours ago | parent | next [-]

So the right way to use yolobox is to spin up one VM as a secure sandbox, and then use yolobox to separate individual agents within the VM?

	▲	Finbarr 15 hours ago \| parent [-]
		I wouldn't assume that a VM will give you complete security against a determined AI. yolobox started as a way to prevent accidental `rm -rf ~` and has expanded into a set of tools that make working with CLI agents easier. Personally, I run yolobox directly on the host. Being able to tell the agent it has sudo and can install and do whatever it needs to accomplish any task is handy.

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CodesInChaos 16 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

Sounds interesting. What kind of exploits did they find, apart from docker being exposed?

	▲	Finbarr 16 hours ago \| parent [-]
		Docker was only exposed later, after I realized that any sufficiently determined AI could break out of the container, and attempts to contain it were a waste of time. Also note that the docker socket is not exposed by default. There's a --docker flag for this. I made some comments about exploits in the original post [1]. Gemini was quite creative in adding git hooks to the repo that would execute on the host machine. That folder is shared.