> Should a security researcher that identifies a vulnerability in electron.js need to identify _every_ possible project using electron.js to communicate with them the vulnerability exists? No. That's absurd.

But this is a false comparison, right? The scope of "Linux distributions" and "electron apps" are orders of magnitude different. If the reporter spot checked one or two of the most popular distributions to see if fixes had been adopted, that seems like an extra level of nice diligence before publicizing the details.

It doesn't seem "insane" as much as "not the most efficient path" as has already been well argued. But it also doesn't seem unreasonable to think in a project of the scope of the Linux kernel, with the potential impact of fairly effective(?) privilege escalation, some extra consideration is reasonable--certainly not "insane" at the very least?

▲

tptacek 2 hours ago | parent [-]

They embargoed their vulnerability for 30 days after Linux landed a kernel patch. They did their part. You will always be able to come up with other things they could do for you, and they will always at first blush sound reasonable because of how big and important Linux is, but none of those things will be responsibilities of the vulnerability researcher. Their job is to bring information to light, not to manage downstreams.

About half the thread we're on reads as if the commenters believe Xint made this vulnerability. They did not: they alerted you to it. It was already there.

▲

opello 2 hours ago | parent [-]

I realize you've been championing this idea in the thread, and I admire it because I also recognize the misdirected blame. Please understand I do not harbor "blame" for the researchers.

> Their job is to bring information to light, not to manage downstreams.

The researchers are also members of a community in which more harm than is necessary may be dealt by their actions. Nuance must exist in evaluating "reasonable" and "responsible" in the context of actions.

▲

tptacek 2 hours ago | parent [-]

I strongly disagree. I want the information. I don't want to wait longer to find out about critical vulnerabilities so that researchers can fully genuflect to whatever Linux distribution norms people on message boards have. Their "actions" were to disclose a vulnerability that already existed and was putting people at risk. It's an absolute good.

If it helps you out any, even though my logic was absolutely the same and just as categorical in 2012 as it is today: there are now multiple automated projects that run every merged Linux commit through frontier models to scope them (the status quo ante of the patch) out for exploitability, and then add them to libraries of automatically-exploitable bugs.

People here are just mad that they heard about the bug. Serious attackers had this the moment it hit the kernel. This whole debate is kind of farcical. It's about a "real time" response this week to a disaster that struck a month ago.

▲

opello 2 hours ago | parent [-]

I do get that, this era of automation is too responsive to not go public to provoke action. I think I might just be wistful of an era in which the alternate path might have made a difference. Sorry to pile on.

	▲	tptacek 2 hours ago \| parent [-]
		You're not piling on and I'm glad to have the opportunity to expand on my point.