Don't think of it as a materials simulation engineer being recruited and trained on how to write complex malware.

Rather this was developed by a team of 6-8 people. Maybe two or three of them working on the implant, another engineer handling the exploits and propagation, and yet another building the LP and communications channels. They are supported by a scientist with deep knowledge of the process they are messing around with (say developing nuclear weapons), and a mathematician that knows how to introduce subtle and undetectable errors.

Try to remember how hypothetical everything tended to be before Snowden. And 'twas a meager pittance that was revealed. They have toys that'd blow minds and people yee'd swear weren't people. It's all fun and games to poke fun, but holy shit those guys are NTBF'dW.

Every academic institution, every school, all under the radar of recruitment and more. It's difficult to believe, but the network is real.

There are certainly people here on HN who've been solicited, most who'll never mention it.

It's fun to imagine, though, what tight groups of highly motivated, stupidly intelligent people can do when they collectively commit to doing so - and with a hefty budget to assist.

My favorite part of the paper is that the “attack” isn’t just exploiting a bug — it’s exploiting how different components interpret the same input. Modifying an executable as it’s loaded into memory is one example, but the deeper pattern is the mismatch.

What’s interesting about the malware in this post is that it goes one step further: instead of exploiting mismatches, it corrupts the computation itself — so every infected system agrees on the same wrong answer!

More broadly: any interpretive mismatch between components creates a failure surface. Sometimes it shows up as a bug, sometimes as an exploit primitive, sometimes as a testing blind spot. You see it everywhere — this paper, IDS vs OS, proxies vs backends, test vs prod, and now LLMs vs “guardrails.”

Fun HN moment for me: as I was about to post this, I noticed a reply from @tptacek himself. His 1998 paper with Newsham (IDS vs OS mismatches) was my first exposure to this idea — and in hindsight it nudged me toward infosec, the Atlanta scene, spam filtering (PG's bayesian stuff) and eventually YC.

https://users.ece.cmu.edu/~adrian/731-sp04/readings/Ptacek-N...

The paper starts with this Einstein quote "Not everything that is counted counts and not everything that counts can be counted", which seems quite apt for the malware analyzed here :)

I do wonder if these breadcrumbs were also left intentionally. “Oh look, we are using old stuff, don’t be afraid!” Or for some other reason. It is a little surprising to pull off such a sophisticated attack and miss details you could find running ‘strings’ unless I’m missing something and this part was encrypted.

> People used RCS well into the 2000s!

I still use RCS today. It's certainly not my preferred option, but my collaborator likes it, and it's not too annoying for me to use.

Subversion 1.0 was released in 2004, but it was already widely used before then.

We used cvs, but did switch to svn before/around 2006, but I could be mixing that up. We did not switch to git even by 2012 when I left.

The reference to the 70s and 80s code didn’t imply it was version controlled before svn/cvs though if that’s what you meant, but by that time it was and still had old timestamps commented in the text files.