First, sorry for the earlier sarcasm.

I agree that people in administrative or support roles can still have access to sensitive information and could, in theory, be targets.

But that still defines a very large group. If we include anyone with potential access across different institutions, roles, and locations, then it becomes easy to see patterns in what could simply be unrelated cases.

The key question is whether there is any concrete overlap — same organization, same project, same timeframe, or any shared operational detail. Without that, it feels more like a pattern being inferred after the fact than evidence of a coordinated connection.

More broadly, if we make the category of “possible targets” to wide, it stops meaning much. The default assumption should be that these are unrelated events, unless there’s clear evidence tying them together. Simply saying they could be targets does't really change that.

I think this is an interesting pattern, but I see your point. The network effects of ~people a degree removed from direct nuclear research~ gets big.