| ▲ | bootsmann 3 hours ago | |||||||||||||
> Real cryptographic unlinkability schemes like BBS+ or CL signatures would produce uncorrelated proofs even on reuse. This is not that. This discussion was already led ad nauseam with the Swiss eID proposal (which is supposed to be EUID compatible) and the reason why the system relies on rotating signatures instead of ZKPs is that the cryptography hardware modules in most phones don't support algorithms such as BBS+. This creates a tradeoff where the states would have to essentially roll their own crypto storage and bank on this being safer than simply rotating through batches of signatures generated by the hardware cryptography modules (which is largely unproblematic in the grand scheme of things). The major advantage of using the hardware module is that it makes it much harder for attackers to extract the actual secret should the device ever fall into someone else's hands, something that happens to phones from time to time. Overall, as with every digital ID thread, it would help if some of the fearmon gering commentators would read the actually EUDI specs for once in their lives as it already addresses most of the concerns copy-pasted into these threads https://eudi.dev/1.6.0/architecture-and-reference-framework-.... | ||||||||||||||
| ▲ | raverbashing 3 hours ago | parent [-] | |||||||||||||
> Overall, as with every digital ID thread, it would help if some of the fearmon gering commentators would read the actually EUDI specs for once in their lives Yeah I'm getting really really tired of the "crying wolf" crowd | ||||||||||||||
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