In what way is TPM protecting your data if someone steals the entire server? TPM only ensures that the boot environment has not been modified. Whatever key is being used to automatically decrypt the disk would be in the clear.

Unless I'm misunderstanding your situation, I think you should look up the "Evil Maid Attack" to better understand how to mitigate risk for your threat model.

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hfjtnrkdkf 2 days ago | parent [-]

assuming there are no bugs in linux and you enable full memory encryption in BIOS, it protects you in the same way the FBI cant get into a locked iphone they physically posess

but linux is not as secure as an iphone, and linux users typically dont know how to set this up, so in practice you are right, it doesnt protect you

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Gigachad 2 days ago | parent | next [-]

My threat model is a junkie breaks in to my house and flips my server on facebook marketplace. Then the buyer curiously pokes through my hard drives. Of course if protecting against government agencies is the threat model then TPM alone isn't enough.

For me, a zero friction way to have decent security is worlds better than the normal state where homeservers are not encrypted at all.

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zenoprax 2 days ago | parent [-]

I just don't understand where the protection comes from if you have automatic password entry. If the thief boots up the server it is just as convenient for them as it is for you.

Your threat model is the same as my use of a laptop: regular LUKS with a password is enough on its own. Add TPM if you want to know that you're entering your password in a secure boot environment (ie. protect against a fake LUKS screen that steals your password).

	▲	Gigachad 2 days ago \| parent [-]
		Because you'll boot up in to a password prompt. So you'd need a password bypass exploit to get in. If you attempt to change the boot device or kernel the TPM won't release the key.

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zenoprax 2 days ago | parent | prev [-]

Yes, but not by automating the password process. You could probably do some sort of remote authentication with a custom iniramfs that will "phone home" for a key but that initramfs, even if signed and protected from tampering, is still exposing the authentication end point.

The attacker would just need to spoof the request to gain the key.