handedness 2 hours ago | parent | next [-]

You should note that improperly using Qubes OS, creating a New Identity inside of Tor Browser, even in a disposable Whonix workstation VM, would leave one vulnerable to this.

A user would have to manually start a new disposable VM for each identity.

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Barbing 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

>Why Qubes OS?

>Physical isolation is a given safeguard that the digital world lacks

…

>In our digital lives, the situation is quite different: All of our activities typically happen on a single device. This causes us to worry about whether it’s safe to click on a link or install an app, since being hacked imperils our entire digital existence.

>Qubes eliminates this concern by allowing us to divide a device into many compartments, much as we divide a physical building into many rooms. …

Sold

https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/introduction/intro.html

	▲	handedness 2 hours ago \| parent [-]
		Qubes OS is a great solution for this threat model. By my (admittedly cursory) understanding of this attack, one would have to chain the attack to escalate to dom0 to get around it. Having said that, fsflover exhibits a poor grasp of how this stuff works and all should be aware that even in Qubes OS, one would need to spawn new disposable VMs for each identity; relying on the Tor Browser's new identity creation within the same disposable VM would be little different from running Tor Browser on a traditional OS.