| ▲ | rehevkor5 a day ago | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
For Yubikey, this guide is worth looking at: https://github.com/drduh/yubikey-guide ("Community guide to using YubiKey for GnuPG and SSH - protect secrets with hardware crypto.") | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| ▲ | Liskni_si a day ago | parent | next [-] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
It's also a bit outdated. OpenSSH supports FIDO2 natively, so all this gnupg stuff is unnecessary for ssh. One can even use yubikey-backed ssh keys for commit signing. And the best thing is that you can create several different ssh keys this way, each with a different password, if that's something you prefer. Then you need to type the password _and_ touch the yubikey. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| ▲ | TacticalCoder a day ago | parent | prev [-] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
I'd say this is more up to date: https://www.stavros.io/posts/u2f-fido2-with-ssh/ We've got private Git repos only accessible through ssh (and the users' shell is set to git-shell) and it's SSH only through Yubikey. The challenge to auth happens inside the Yubikey and the secret never leaves the Yubikey. This doesn't solve all the worlds' problem (like hunger and war) but at least people are definitely NOT committing to the repo without physically having access to the Yubikey and pushing on it (now ofc a dev's computer may be compromised and he may confirm auth on his Yubikey and push things he didn't meant to but that's a far cry from "we stole your private SSH key after you entered your passphrase a friday evening and are now pushing stuff in your name to 100 repos of yours during the week-end"). | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||