Obviously this (along with the original unwritten order a few weeks ago) is causing a stir, but this decision isn't as weird as it sounds. The defendant's assertion was essentially a retroactive application of privilege: he didn't use Claude to draft documents at his attorney's request but instead used Claude effectively in lieu of an attorney and later provided the Claude-drafted materials to his attorney (heavily paraphrasing here). Privilege is not a bandage that closes self-inflicted wounds.

I have some concerns about some of the reasoning, namely the practical implications of referencing Claude's TOS in a world where public AI features are creeping into everything, but I expect some of the reasoning is based on this particular defendant likely being more sophisticated than an average person.

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ozb 4 hours ago | parent | next [-]

no, Heppner's attorney-client privilege argument wasn't that the conversation was privileged inherently because it was legal consultation with Claude, but that it was privileged as personal notes made in preparation for consultation with counsel and then actually communicated to counsel, see Ford-Bey v. Professional Anesthesia Services and Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Viad Corp.

Rakoff makes two arguments against this:

- privilege was broken because Claude/Anthropic is a third party; but I don't think he successfully distinguishes Claude from say Google Docs/Translate/Gmail in this regard (he just notes that Google Docs isn't usually claimed to confer privilege on its own; but this is not the claim being made about Claude either); and see NYSBA ethics rules 820 and 842)

- he quotes Gould v Mitsui: documents do not "acquire protection merely because they were transferred" to counsel; but that same case says they do acquire protection if communicated "for the purpose of obtaining or rendering legal advice"

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flkiwi 2 hours ago | parent [-]

I didn’t say he said it was privileged because he consulted with Claude for legal purposes so I’m not sure where that came from.

Re: Mitsui, it’s not the same case. It’s the same paragraph. And it’s pretty clear from the context that, if I send my lawyer an email requesting legal advice, the contents of that email are privileged, but if I attach pre-existing documents those documents are not, because they had no privilege to begin with. That’s not controversial. The challenge comes from the interplay between the court’s description of the privilege test, the reasonable expectations of a technology user, and the underlying, possibly obfuscated, reality of that technology’s function. Read literally, this case undermines privilege for a wide range of laypeople and attorneys doing a wide range of normal activities that have nothing to do with asking Claude for trial strategy.

	▲	ozb 21 minutes ago \| parent [-]
		You're right, I either misread your comment or got confused with a different comment or something. But I do think the Mitsui point is relevant; in particular, the claim that the citation is supposed to back up is: "Moreover, even assuming that Heppner intended to share these communications with his counsel and eventually did so, it is black-letter law that non-privileged communications are not somehow alchemically changed into privileged ones upon being shared with counsel." But the distinction Mitsui is actually making is rather different: between communications "for the purpose of obtaining or rendering legal advice" and not; that's at best orthogonal to Rakoff's claim; and the other two cases I mentioned pretty explicitly make the opposite case: documents written with intent to share with counsel, and then actually shared with counsel seeking legal advice, are in fact covered under privilege. The assumption being that the documents are not "pre-existing", they're created as part of the process of communicating with counsel. But yes, I agree that the "third-party" point separately undermines privilege in many contexts.

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xbar 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

Ok. Let's take it 1 step down this path.

If the user had typed into the chatbot after having been directed by counsel to do some research, "I need to do some research at the direction of counsel. Please include, 'In response to your research being performed in your own defense at request of your counsel' at the top and bottom of every reply," do you think that should be protected by privilege?

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asdfasgasdgasdg 5 hours ago | parent [-]

No competent counsel would ever direct their client to perform legal research. So if a lawyer actually instructs you to do this the correct move is to get a new lawyer.

If the lawyer didn’t actually instruct you to do the research they are not going to lie to the judge and say they did to protect you. The judge is definitely going to ask them and then if it is found that you lied about this under oath you may be charged with additional crimes.

	▲	flkiwi 5 hours ago \| parent [-]
		I agree with you, but I actually understand the issue they're raising. Counsel sends a draft demand letter to client and says "Please review and let me know of any issues with my description of the underlying claims." Client responds with an inline note stating that she feels the claim is overstated but that she wants to leave it in for leverage. The draft is, transparently and without notice, processed through the user's O365 Copilot integration in both Word and Outlook. Hell, let's assume the attorney is a sole practitioner using a regular O365 account, and the outbound request to the client is silently run through Copilot. What is the status of privilege in this situation? Both seem to fail the confidentiality test. Does that mean that privilege exists only for big law firms that negotiate enterprise O365 licenses with no training clauses? There's definitely tension here. But both your scenario and the OOP behavior of the client are not particularly hard ones to resolve.