> Each case runs three agents: a Curator reads the advisory and builds an answer key, a Finder (the model under test) gets 24 shell steps to explore the code and write a structured report, and a Judge scores the blinded submission. The Finder never sees the patch. It starts from sink hints and must trace the bug through actual code.

Curator, answer key, Finder, shell steps, structured report, sink hints… I understand nothing. Did you use an LLM to generate this HN submission?

It looks like a standard LLM-as-a-judge approach. Do you manually validate or verify some of the results? Done poorly, the results can be very noisy and meaningless.

I worked in AppSec in the past, made sense to me. Maybe you aren't the target audience?

You don't really need manual verification for these, the CVEs (vulnerabilities) are public and can be programmatically validated.

Is this really that hard to parse?

Curator and Finder are the names of the agents. "answer key" - haven't you ever taken a test in high school? It's an explanation of the answer. "shell steps" I presume means it gets to run 24 commands on the shell. "structured report" - do I really need to explain to you what a report is? "sink hints" - I admit I didn't know this one, but a bit of searching indicates that it's a hint at where the vulnerability lies.

> Did you use an LLM to generate this HN submission?

Must have.

> The Finder will never see the patch.

I wasn’t worried that this eval would show the answer to the model before evaluating it. Seems requirements leaked into this post.