Open Source Security at Astral

raphinou 31 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

One (amongst other) big problem with current software supply chain is that a lot of tools and dependencies are downloaded (eg from GitHub releases) without any validation that it was published by the expected author. That's why I'm working on an open source, auditable, accountless, self hostable, multi sig file authentication solution. The multi sig approach can protect against axios-like breaches. If this is of interest to you, take a look at https://asfaload.com/

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darkamaul 22 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

I’m maybe not understanding here, but isn’t it the point of release attestations (to authenticate that the release was produced by the authors)?

[0] https://docs.github.com/en/actions/how-tos/secure-your-work/...

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raphinou 10 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

Artifact attestation are indeed another solution based on https://www.sigstore.dev/ . I still think Asfaload is a good alternative, making different choices than sigstore:

- Asfaload is accountless(keys are identity) while sigstore relies on openid connect[1], which will tie most user to a mega corp

- Asfaload ' backend is a public git, making it easily auditable

- Asfaload will be easy to self host, meaning you can easily deploy it internally

- Asfaload is multisig, meaning event if GitHub account is breached, malevolent artifacts can be detected

- validating a download is transparant to the user, which only requires the download url, contrary to sigstore [2]

So Asfaload is not the only solution, but I think it has some unique characteristics that make it worth evaluating.

1:https://docs.sigstore.dev/about/security/

2: https://docs.sigstore.dev/cosign/verifying/verify/

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arianvanp 9 minutes ago | parent | prev [-]

The problem is nobody checks.

All the axios releases had attestations except for the compromised one. npm installed it anyway.

	▲	raphinou 6 minutes ago \| parent [-]
		Yes, that's why I aim to make the checks transparant to the user. You only need to provide the download url for the authentication to take place. I really need to record a small demo of it.

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snthpy 18 minutes ago | parent | prev [-]

Overall I believe this is the right approach and something like this is what's required. I can't see any code or your product though so I'm not sure what to make of it.

	▲	raphinou 8 minutes ago \| parent [-]
		Here's the GitHub repo of the backend code: https://github.com/asfaload/asfaload There's also a spec of the approach at https://github.com/asfaload/spec I'm looking for early testers, let me know if you are interested to test it !

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ramoz 6 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Created an agent skill based on this blog. Assessing my own repos now.

https://github.com/backnotprop/oss-security-audit

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sevg 42 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-]

FYI it was actually William Woodruff (the article author) and his team at Trail of Bits that worked with PyPI to implement Trusted Publishing.

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darkamaul an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-]

With the recent incidents affecting Trivy and litellm, I find it extremely useful to have a guide on what to do to secure your release process.

The advices here are really solid and actionable, and I would suggest any team to read them, and implement them if possible.

The scary part with supply chain security is that we are only as secure as our dependencies, and if the platform you’re using has non secure defaults, the efforts to secure the full chain are that much higher.

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ChrisArchitect 32 minutes ago | parent | prev [-]

Earlier submission from author: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47691466