> Full disk encryption protects from somebody yanking a hard drive from running server (actually happens) or stealing a laptop.

Both of these are super easy to solve without secure boot: The device uses FDE and the key is provided over the network during boot, in the laptop case after the user provides a password. Doing it this way is significantly more secure than using a TPM because the network can stop providing the key as soon as the device is stolen and then the key was never in non-volatile storage anywhere on the device and can't be extracted from a powered off device even with physical access and specialized equipment.

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tremon 2 hours ago | parent | next [-]

> the device uses FDE and the key is provided over the network during boot

An example of such an implementation, since well before TPMs were commonplace: https://www.recompile.se/mandos

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mschuster91 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

> The device uses FDE and they key is provided over the network during boot, in the laptop case after the user provides a password.

Sounds nice on paper, has issues in practice:

1. no internet (e.g. something like Iran)? Your device is effectively bricked.

2. heavily monitored internet (e.g. China, USA)? It's probably easy enough for the government to snoop your connection metadata and seize the physical server.

3. no security at all against hardware implants / base firmware modification. Secure Boot can cryptographically prove to the OS that your BIOS, your ACPI tables and your bootloader didn't get manipulated.

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AnthonyMouse 2 hours ago | parent | next [-]

> no internet (e.g. something like Iran)? Your device is effectively bricked.

If your threat model is Iran and you want the device to boot with no internet then you memorize the long passphrase.

> heavily monitored internet (e.g. China, USA)? It's probably easy enough for the government to snoop your connection metadata and seize the physical server.

The server doesn't have to be in their jurisdiction. It can also use FDE itself and then the key for that is stored offline in an undisclosed location.

> no security at all against hardware implants / base firmware modification. Secure Boot can cryptographically prove to the OS that your BIOS, your ACPI tables and your bootloader didn't get manipulated.

If your BIOS or bootloader is compromised then so is your OS.

	▲	mschuster91 39 minutes ago \| parent [-]
		> If your threat model is Iran Well... they wouldn't be the first ones to black out the Internet either. And I'm not just talking about threats specific to oneself here because that is a much different threat model, but the effects of being collateral damage as well. Say, your country's leader says something that makes the US President cry - who's to say he doesn't order SpaceX to disable Starlink for your country? Or that Russia decides to invade yet another country and disables internet satellites [1]? And it doesn't have to be politically related either, say that a natural disaster in your area takes out everything smarter than a toaster for days if not weeks [2]. > If your BIOS or bootloader is compromised then so is your OS. well, that's the point of the TPM design and Secure Boot: that is not true any more. The OS can verify everything being executed prior to its startup back to a trusted root. You'd need 0-day exploits - while these are available including unpatchable hardware issues (iOS checkm8 [3]), they are incredibly rare and expensive. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Viasat_hack [2] https://www.telekom.com/de/blog/netz/artikel/lost-place-und-... [3] https://theapplewiki.com/wiki/Checkm8_Exploit

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amatecha an hour ago | parent | prev [-]

they said network, not internet :)