| ▲ | nicbou 2 hours ago | |
My point is that you can't bomb a country into submission. You can use strategic air power in addition to other methods, but the bombing alone was proven again and again to fail. More often than not, it hardens the enemy's resolve. Bombing Britain failed. Bombing Germany failed (except for dragging the Luftwaffe into a war of attrition). Bombing Japan failed on its own until Japan had no navy left afloat, and the Russians savaged their army in China. The bomb accelerated a victory achieved through other means. In Korea, Americans levelled cities and infrastructure until there was nothing left to bomb. That did not win the war. In Vietnam, Linebacker failed. Linebacker II bought slightly more favourable terms for the US in negotiations, but in the end, North Vietnam won. Even the Desert Storm curbstomp would not have worked without boots on the ground. I'm just rehashing a better post on this exact topic: https://acoup.blog/2022/10/21/collections-strategic-airpower... | ||
| ▲ | leonidasrup an hour ago | parent [-] | |
The destruction of Japan and Germany was much more extensive than Britain. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_bombing_during_World... Yes bombing of Japan was a factor in surrender, but not the only one. Destruction of much industry, destruction of navy, all their allies were defeated. There were preparations for invasion of Japan or continuous atomic bombing, if Japan would not surrender. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Downfall https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Shot "Two more Fat Man assemblies were readied and scheduled to leave Kirtland Field for Tinian on 11 and 14 August" "At Los Alamos Laboratory, technicians worked 24 hours straight to cast another plutonium core. Although cast, it still needed to be pressed and coated, which would take until 16 August. Therefore, it could have been ready for use on 19 August." The rate of bomb production was one of the Manhattan Project’s most closely guarded secrets. Expected rate of production by General Groves: "The production rate of 3 bombs per month in August was expected to rise to 5 bombs per month in November, and 7 bombs per month in December. In 1946, it could rise much higher." https://www.dannen.com/decision/bomb-rate.html As is written in: https://acoup.blog/2022/10/21/collections-strategic-airpower... "In Vietnam, the same problem complicated any effort at industrial bombing: the factories that supplied the North Vietnamese forces (both the regular PAVN and irregular NLF) were in China and especially the USSR. Moreover the population was not broadly dependent on centralized utilities (like electricity) which could be bombed." The article tries to apply lesson from past bombing campaigns to war in Ukraine, but this don't apply because Russia could not establish air supremacy over Ukraine and could not apply large scale heavy bombing. And I hope that they never will... | ||