> Nicholas has found hundreds more potential bugs in the Linux kernel, but the bottleneck to fixing them is the manual step of humans sorting through all of Claude’s findings

No, the problem is sorting out thousands of false positives from claude code's reports. 5 out of 1000+ reports to be valid is statistically worse than running a fuzzer on the codebase.

Just sayin'

> 5 out of 1000+ reports to be valid is statistically worse than running a fuzzer on the codebase.

Carlini said "hundreds" of crashes, not 1000+.

It's not that only 5 were true positives and the rest were false positives. 5 were true positives and Carlini doesn't have bandwidth to review the rest. Presumably he's reviewed more than 5 and some were not worth reporting, but we don't know what that number is. It's almost certainly not hundreds.

Keep in mind that Carlini's not a dedicated security engineer for Linux. He's seeing what's possible with LLMs and his team is simultaneously exploring the Linux kernel, Firefox,[0] GhostScript, OpenSC,[1] and probably lots of others that they can't disclose because they're not yet fixed.

[0] https://www.anthropic.com/news/mozilla-firefox-security

[1] https://red.anthropic.com/2026/zero-days/

> On the kernel security list we've seen a huge bump of reports. We were between 2 and 3 per week maybe two years ago, then reached probably 10 a week over the last year with the only difference being only AI slop, and now since the beginning of the year we're around 5-10 per day depending on the days (fridays and tuesdays seem the worst). Now most of these reports are correct, to the point that we had to bring in more maintainers to help us. ... Also it's interesting to keep thinking that these bugs are within reach from criminals so they deserve to get fixed.

https://lwn.net/Articles/1065620/