This is an interesting article. I feel like the point the author thinks he's making isn't maybe the one he's actually making, or at least not the one he ought to be making.

The problem is he sets this up as a contrast between, on the one side, quantification, evidence, "graphs", and the like; and, on the other side, "your eyes", "lived experience", and so on.

But these are not necessarily in opposition. There is nothing unquantifiable about "lived experience" or people opinions about crime, nor is there any reason to dismiss such data as irrelevant to policy decisions.

Even if the "church of graphs" showed crime on a clear upswing, it would be absurd to say, "Crime has gone up, therefore we must build a new prison." To justify that action requires more than just that bare fact; it requires some kind of causal analysis that explains why that action would play a causal role in producing some desirable effect (like reducing crime).

On the flip side, it is not absurd to say "Surveys show that the perceived level of crime has gone up, so we should explore policies to address that." This is especially true if you swap "perceived level of crime has gone up" for "perceived quality of life has gone down", because perception is in some measure an irrefutable judgment on quality of life. (That is, if you think your quality of life has gone done, then to at least some degree it factually has, because part of what it means to have a good life is to know that your life is good and to be happy about that.) Such a swap is likely warranted, because many of the author's examples of "crime" in the article make more sense as examples of quality of life. Seeing things locked up in stores is not experiencing crime or even perceiving an increase in crime; it is experiencing a decline in quality of life which may plausibly be an effect of an increase in crime, but that's not the same thing.

So just having data doesn't tell you what to do, and just having feelings and perceptions doesn't mean you shouldn't do anything. What's missing in both cases is the causal explanation of how the data and/or the perceptions arose.

Whenever I see people talking about "lived experience" I get a bit leery, because often that seems to be a lead-in to an argument of the form "I personally experienced X, therefore large-scale change Y should be implemented." The fallacy there is not starting from perception or from gut feelings; it's starting from just your own perceptions and gut feelings. If you can get data that shows a lot of people share your perceptions and gut feelings, then we can have something to work with. What we do with that information can vary: sometimes there is a causal theory to be developed and action to be taken that can trickle down into a change in those perceptions; sometimes the answer is better education or messaging that makes clear to people that their perceptions were inaccurate. But the problem is not a "church of graphs".

With regard to the issue of crime as discussed in this article, it seems likely to me that the data adduced in support of the "there is no crime problem" position is missing something important that has a genuine impact on people's quality of life. This doesn't mean the data we have is wrong or irrelevant; it just means it's not the whole story. If you have a bunch of data on temperatures in different places around the world and you use that to pick the best place to live, you may be disappointed if you get there and find it's raining all the time. That doesn't mean your data was bad (temperature surely is a major determinant of what makes us like a certain climate) but that it's incomplete (you need more than just temperature).

The solution to this is not to give up on data, it's to bring more data into the fold. Data on people's perceptions is immensely useful as a starting point for policy. It's not an endpoint, but then neither is any other data.