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acheong08 12 hours ago

There are so many scanners these days these things get caught pretty quick. I think we need either npm or someone else to have a registry that only lets through packages that pass these scanners. Can even do the virustotal thing of aggregating reports by multiple scanners. NPM publishes attestation for trusted build environments. Google has oss-rebuild.

All it takes is an `npm config set` to switch registries anyways. The hard part is having a central party that is able to convince all the various security companies to collaborate rather than having dozens of different registries each from each company.

Rather than just a hard-coded delay, I think having policies on what checks must pass first makes sense with overrides for when CVEs show up.

(WIP)

drum55 11 hours ago | parent | next [-]

The ones you hear about are caught quickly, I’m more worried about the non obvious ones. So far none of these have been as simple as changing a true to a false and bypassing all auth for all products or something, and would that be caught by an automated scanner?

acheong08 4 hours ago | parent [-]

There are definitely levels to this. Yes I think it can be caught by automated scanners in theory. Either commit by commit scanning and reproducible builds or fuzzing and getting the behavioral differences between versions

pamcake 6 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

Sounds great until trivy images get compromised, like last week.

acheong08 4 hours ago | parent [-]

Hence why you source data from multiple vendors I'd say. Rather than putting all eggs in one basket