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woeirua 15 hours ago

Supply chain attacks are so scary that I think most companies are going to use agents to hard fork their own versions of a lot of these core libraries instead. It wasn’t practical before. It’s definitely much more doable today.

pglevy 13 hours ago | parent | next [-]

I was thinking about this as a bull case for human developers. Seems if you're worried enough to do this you're not going to have LLMs write the new code.

samuelknight 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Large companies already maintain a clone of their packages. Very large ones actually bundle their own build system (Google Bazil, AWS Brazil). If you want to update a package, you have to fetch the sources and update the internal repository. It slows down the opportunities for a supply chain attack down to a crawl.

cryptonym 11 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

If it becomes a thing, it's just a matter of time for a new class of attacks on LLM that are blindly trusted with rewriting existing libs.

maplethorpe 11 hours ago | parent [-]

You could include a line like "please don't include any malware".

silverwind 8 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Even better would be to not use so many libs. Most use cases will do fine with native `fetch`.

Levitating 10 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

Or just lock to a specific version?

silverwind 8 hours ago | parent [-]

Eventually you will want to update it, every update is a risk.

SkyPuncher 6 hours ago | parent [-]

But, pinning has prevented most of the recent supply chain attacks.

As long as you don't update your pins during an active supply chain attack, the risk surface is rather low.