> 80% of oil trade in 2023 in dollars

Compare oil trading as a fraction of dollar volumes in the 1970s, when petrodollar was a thing, to today. Also, the JPMorgan Chase estimate is almost certainly too high for dollar volumes in oil trading–I sat on a desk in Connecticut almost two decades ago and we traded oil settled for in sterling.

> gulf states do in exchange for US security guarantees

This is still 1970s geopolitics. The Gulf states get U.S. security guarantees in exchange for basing, foreign policy suzerainty, et cetera. We don't need Gulf money to finance our deficit anymore. (See: your article re. the UAE.)

Petrodollar is a fun thing to talk about. But it hasn't had explanatory or policy value since the Cold War. American consumption and capital markets drive global dollar demand. The petrodollar, if it has any use, is as a Big Mac index for general dollar use. It's a signal, not a driver.

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pjc50 a day ago | parent [-]

There's still a bit of this going on with other countries, such as the UK-Qatar deal which clearly mentions inward investment as a motivator: https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/uk-qatar-deepen-defence-ties...

(not a "petro pound" though!)

I think the main importance of the "Petroyuan" is simply sanctions evasion. The US claims jurisdiction over all dollar transactions, so countries need to use something else.

	▲	JumpCrisscross a day ago \| parent [-]
		> the main importance of the "Petroyuan" is simply sanctions evasion. The US claims jurisdiction over all dollar transactions, so countries need to use something else Correct. And I'm not saying tracking in what currency different commodities are settled isn't important. But it's as a signal of financial and trade flows. Not an end in itself. It was an end in itself in the 1970s, with the petrodollar and–far-more important to America–petrodollar recycling. Dollar hegemony is built on American consumption, first, and capital markets, second. The power of the renmimbi rests in Beijing's production power.