| ▲ | hvb2 2 hours ago | |
That is a wild claim. I can't imagine that being correct given how that's been abused in the past https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/08/iranian-man-middle-att... | ||
| ▲ | ceejayoz an hour ago | parent | next [-] | |
It's a pretty huge list. https://support.apple.com/en-us/126047 The chances of zero of these CAs having been compromised by state-level actors seems… slim. Do you trust "Hongkong Post Root CA 3" not to fuck with things? Your link's from 2011; the US government was still in the trusted list until 2018. https://www.idmanagement.gov/implement/announcements/04_appl... | ||
| ▲ | cookiengineer an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | |
> That is a wild claim China telecom regularly has BGP announcements that conflict with level3's ASNs. Just as a hint in case you want to dig more into the topic, RIR data is publicly available, so you can verify yourself who the offenders are. Also check out the Geedge leaked source code, which also implements TLS overrides and inspection on a country scale. A lot of countries are customers of Geedge's tech stack, especially in the Middle East. Just sayin' it's more common than you're willing to acknowledge. | ||