| |
| ▲ | ndsipa_pomu 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Obviously government secrets need to be properly secured, but the personal info/photos of a top official can often be used for blackmail or for determining close friends that could be used to compromise Patel. | | |
| ▲ | leereeves 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | There's so much speculation about how this hack could conceivably be damaging, but so little evidence that it actually contained anything damaging. | | |
| ▲ | thephyber 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | “The enemy broke into our nuke silo, killed our Air Force manned crew, stole the nuke codes, launched the missile. Not a big deal because we shot it down before it hit its target.” Most of the time, actual harm is the most important issue. In this case because that office holds so much centralized power and authority over many aspects of American life (domestic law enforcement, some foreign law enforcement, domestic counterterrorism / counterintelligence / counterespionage, and security clearance background checks for all VIPs), the means are equally as important as the ends. And I would throw in a wrinkle: what evidence is there that the dumps were not stripped of the most useful blackmail material? If I were in charge of a hack operation, I would dump the low impact stuff to show the world how much of a joke this guy’s security is, but only after I already used the best stuff to blackmail him months ago. | | |
| ▲ | leereeves an hour ago | parent [-] | | The scenario you're proposing is more like "They broke into our silo and launched a nuke, then they shot it down themselves." A successful blackmailer doesn't want the security breach exposed or investigated, they want to continue to use the victim. |
| |
| ▲ | ndsipa_pomu 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Security through luck? The reality is that officials are targetted by various states looking to get some leverage, so not properly securing an email account is a serious failing unless it's part of a wider honeypot scheme. Personally, I'm not convinced that the current U.S. administration is competent enough to plan ahead and implement honeypots. | | |
| ▲ | leereeves 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | No point in going round and round with personal opinions and general speculation. The debate is easily settled: just point to some actual harm done by this hack. | | |
| ▲ | ndsipa_pomu 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | I don't think you really understand how blackmail works. If the information is public, then that's a failed blackmail attempt. Also, the U.S. administration is unlikely to provide public information on how top officials have been compromised. It's not really much of a debate as it's widely acknowledged that letting enemy states get access to the email accounts of officials is a really bad idea. |
|
|
|
| |
| ▲ | thephyber 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Bad take. Patel specifically bypassed security clearance protocols for Bongino and other staff he hired. His top priority isn’t protecting government secrets — it’s to take down what he thinks is the part of the US government that resists bending to Trump’s will. And you are wrong that the FBI shouldn’t care about securing the Director’s private life information. Anything and everything can and will be used to blackmail him by foreign governments, criminals, political actors. I highly doubt the first public dump of messages would include the most compromising content — that’s like handing away a maximum severity zero day for the most common OS in the federal government. There’s no logical reason to do that for free, so I suspect the really incriminating/ salacious stuff was withheld for private use. And if the FBI didn’t enable the high security setting on the FBI Director’s private email account, they might not have known what, if any, compromising materials were in there. | | |
|
