Yes, although what I think is different in this setup here is the OpenShell gateway override, as they mention:

> NemoClaw installs the NVIDIA OpenShell runtime and Nemotron models, then uses a versioned blueprint to create a sandboxed environment where every network request, file access, and inference call is governed by declarative policy. The nemoclaw CLI orchestrates the full stack: OpenShell gateway, sandbox, inference provider, and network policy.

I think this means you get a true proxy layer with a network gateway that let's you stop in-flight requests with policies you define, so it's not their hardware but the combination of it plus OpenShell gateway and network policies.

I also think the reason they are doing this is to try and get some moat around these one-clik deployments and leverage their GPU for rent type of thing instead of having you go buy a mac mini and learn "scary" stuff (remember, the user market here is pretty strange lol)

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hardsnow 2 hours ago | parent [-]

OpenShell is the gem here indeed. A lot of good ideas like network sandbox that does TLS decryption and use of policy engine to set the rules. However:

> Credentials never leak into the sandbox filesystem; they are injected as environment variables at runtime.

If anyone from the team is reading - you should copy surrogate credentials approach from here to secure the credentials further: https://github.com/airutorg/airut/blob/main/doc/network-sand...

	▲	angry_octet 20 minutes ago \| parent [-]
		The LLM will easily leak these credentials out. So the creds should be outside the sandbox, and the only thing the sandbox should see is a connection API that opens a socket/file handle. Alternatively where is needs an API key, it should be one bound to the endpoint using it. E.g. a ticket granting ticket is used to create a bound ticket. A copy on write filesystem would be an interesting way to sandbox writes, but there is difficulty in checking the diff.