I'm not sure this analogy holds, for two reasons. First, even in the best case, chain-of-thought transcripts don't reliably tell you what the agent is doing and why it's doing it. Second, if you're dealing with a malicious actor, the transcript may have no relation to the code they're submitting.

The reason you don't have to look at assembly is that the .c file is essentially a 100% reliable and unambiguous spec of how the assembly will look like, and you will be generating the assembly from that .c file as a part of the build process anyway. I don't see how this works here. It adds a lengthy artifact without lessening the need for a code review. It may be useful for investigations in enterprise settings, but in the OSS ecosystem?...

Also, people using AI coding tools to submit patches to open-source projects are weirdly hesitant to disclose that.