So human become just a provider of those 6 digits code ? That’s already the main problem i have with most agents: I want them to perform a very easy task: « fetch all recepts from website x,y and z and upload them to the correct expense of my expense tracking tool ». Ai are perfectly capable of performing this. But because every website requires sso + 2 fa, without any possibility to remove this, so i effectively have to watch them do it and my whole existence can be summarized as: « look at your phone and input the 6 digits ».

The thing i want ai to be able to do on my behalf is manage those 2fa steps; not add some.

This is where the Claw layer helps — rather than hoping the agent handles the interruption gracefully, you design explicit human approval gates into the execution loop. The Claw pauses, surfaces the 2FA prompt, waits for input, then resumes with full state intact. The problem IMTDb describes isn't really 2FA, it's agents that have a hard time suspending and resuming mid-task cleanly. But that is today, tomorrow, that is an unknown variable.

It's technically possible to use 2FA (e.g. TOTP) on the same device as the agent, if appropriate in your threat model.

In the scenario you describe, 2FA is enforcing a human-in-the-loop test at organizational boundaries. Removing that test will need an even stronger mechanism to determine when a human is needed within the execution loop, e.g. when making persistent changes or spending money, rather than copying non-restricted data from A to B.