| ▲ | tyre 4 hours ago | ||||||||||||||||
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. is an example of the same principle without the name (afaik it wasn’t named that until later.) Basically the FDA tried to use its powers to regulate drugs and devices to regulate nicotine (drug) via cigarettes (device.) The conservatives on the court said, in effect, “look obviously congress didn’t intend to include cigarettes as a medical device, come on.” Then Congress passed a specific law allowing the FDA to regulate cigarettes. This is how it should work. If congress means something that’s a stretch, they should say so specifically. | |||||||||||||||||
| ▲ | bonsai_spool 4 hours ago | parent [-] | ||||||||||||||||
I think that's a fair example but it had the wrinkle that an FDA commissioner explicitly changed what the Agency's position on tobacco regulation was [1]. I don't have as much time to offer a similar assessment of the first two 'official' Major Questions Doctrine cases in the Biden administration, but neither was nearly as contentious as the FDA reversing its prior position. For this reason, I see this decision as an argument against an agency changing course from an accepted previous (but not Congressionally defined) perspective. However, Chevron—at least according to interviews with lawmakers responding to the 'MQD' usage—ran counter to what the supposed understanding of how agency work would function. Again, I can find primary sources later. 1. https://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/22/us/high-court-holds-fda-c... | |||||||||||||||||
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