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ddtaylor 9 hours ago

The problem is the back door.

Decentralized systems don't have the same faults.

Just because you want to force a structure or paradigm doesn't absolve it of responsibility for the problem.

Hand waving the problem away because a company is bad at management or scale doesn't change anything.

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KaiserPro 8 hours ago | parent | next [-]

you are both confusing two issues.

Yes there is a lawful intercept system that operates inside telecoms networks, that is an issue.

The other issue is that there is no real security inside said telecoms networks. (side note, there is still fucking SS7 floating about)

Salt typhoon is not "just hijacking lawful intercept" its ability to fuck with the network in a way that is largely undetected. Sure the intercept stuff might help, but they don't actually need that. In the same way we learnt about state actors taking complete control of middle east telecoms systems, we can be fairly sure that other state actors have taken control of USA telecoms systems

Both the Executive and congress have done shit all about it, and will continue to ignore it until something happens

	▲	maltalex 6 hours ago \| parent \| next [-]
		> you are both confusing two issues. How am I confusing the two? My whole point was the same as yours - that the existence of lawful intercept is a separate issue and that the focus should be on securing telecoms.
	▲	pigggg 7 hours ago \| parent \| prev [-]
		This. The lawful intercept infrastructure is one facet of their network. The rest of their infra is also a deep concern: call records, SS7 signaling, the IP network, mobile infra and it's back end (sim swapping).

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maltalex 9 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

Even if the back door wasn't there, you wouldn't want nation state hackers anywhere near telecoms since they're critical infrastructure. Telecoms should be highly secure. Period.

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ddtaylor 8 hours ago | parent [-]

It's okay to have unlocked backdoors because you don't lock your front door?

	▲	Clent 8 hours ago \| parent \| next [-]
		No, it's pointless to complain about the existence of a backdoor, locked or unlocked because there is a front door that is not being locked.
	▲	maltalex 8 hours ago \| parent \| prev [-]
		I get that you don't like lawful intercept. That's fine. But focusing on only that aspect of telcos derails the conversation and prevents us (in the very broad sense of "us") from making progress on things we all agree on. Can we stop bikeshedding and agree that telcos are critical infrastructure and need to be highly secure in general? A hacker in control of a telco can do as they please regardless of any backdoors or lawful intercept systems. They can just use regular network functions to route calls wherever they want.