| ▲ | Msurrow 12 hours ago | |||||||
But doesn’t your argument that the principal risk [with ssh] is vulnerabilities also apply to the alternatives you say is best practice? Firewalling off ssh (but not http(s)) has the risk of vulns in the FW software. Tailscale, wireguard etc also has the risk of vulns in that software? So what’s the difference in risk of ssh software vulns and other software vulns? Also, another point of view is that vulnerabilities are not very high on the risk ladder. Weak passwords, password reuse etc are far greater risks. So, the alternatives to ssh you suggest are all reliant on passwords but ssh, in the case, is based on secure keys and no passwords. Should “best practices” not include this perpective? | ||||||||
| ▲ | rl3 11 hours ago | parent [-] | |||||||
Good defense is layered. For vulnerabilities, complexity usually equals surface area. WireGuard was created with simplicity in mind. >So, the alternatives to ssh you suggest are all reliant on passwords but ssh, in the case, is based on secure keys and no passwords. WireGuard is key-based. I highly suggest reading its whitepaper: | ||||||||
| ||||||||