> LCF-style provers have a much smaller trusted computing base than Curry/Howard based provers like Coq, Agda and Lean.

I'm not sure that this is correct. The TCB in a CH based prover is just the implementation of the actual kernel. In LCF, you also have to trust that any tactics are implemented in a programming language that doesn't allow you to perform unsound operations. That's a vast expansion in your TCB. (You can implement LCF-like "tactics" in a CH-based prover via so-called reflection that delegates the proof to a runtime computation, but you do have to prove that your computation yields a correct decision for the problem.)

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GregarianChild an hour ago | parent | next [-]

This is wrong as the others replies also point out. Tactics in LCF-style provers are not part of the TCB. Here is an example of the TCB for an industrial strength prover:

○ https://github.com/jrh13/hol-light/blob/master/fusion.ml

A mere 676 LoCs. This miniscule size of the TCB is where the comparatively lesser bug count (despite intense use) comes from.

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ajb 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

My understanding is that tactics output piece of proof, but that this isn't trusted by the TCB of an LCF prover. This is very far from my area of expertise, but seems to be confirmed by https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-39.html

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Dacit 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

No. The whole point of the LCF approach is that only kernel functions can generate theorems. Usually this is done by having a Thm module with opaque thm type (so its instances can only be generated by this module) and embedding the base rules of your logical calculus as shallow functions into that Thm module. Thus, all thm objects are correct by construction (w.r.t. your calculus), and you only need to check the Thm module to verify this.

Tactics generate thms by calling functions of the Thm module in some fashion.

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zozbot234 an hour ago | parent [-]

This does not resolve the issue of how to ensure that the "module" system is itself sound and has no unforeseen escape hatches. You have to assume that it is, or else include a complete programming language implementation as part of your TCB. If your system generates proof objects (possibly allowing for some kind of reflection, with the proof objects merely specifying some kind of computation) you can skip this and simply prove that the kernel itself is correct.

	▲	GregarianChild an hour ago \| parent [-]
		The question: "does the ambient programming language do the right thing?" applies to other provers too. So if you assume the semantics of the implementation language is broken, or the compiler, or the computer executing the code, then those issues also need to be added to the TBC of Curry-Howard provers. There is no free lunch.