How can you be "pretty sure" they're going to develop precisely the technology needed to implement DRM but also will never use or allow it to be used by anybody but the lawful owners of the hardware? You can't.

It's like designing new kinds of nerve gas, "quite sure" that it will only ever be in the hands of good guys who aren't going to hurt people with it. That's powerful naïveté. Once you make it, you can't control who has it and what they use it for. There's no take-backsies, that's why it should never be created in the first place.

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bri3d 2 hours ago | parent [-]

The technology needed to implement DRM has been there for 20+ years and has already evolved in the space where it makes sense from an "evil" standpoint (if you're on that particular side of the fence - Android client attestation), so someone implementing the flip side that might actually be useful doesn't particularly bother me. I remember the 1990s "cryptography is the weapon of evil" arguments too - it's funny how the tables have turned, but I still believe that in general these useful technologies can help people overall.

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mikkupikku 2 hours ago | parent [-]

The technology already exists and also there is unmet industrial market demand for the technology. Incoherent. If it already exists as you say, then Lennart should fuck off and find something else to make.

	▲	bri3d an hour ago \| parent [-]
		> The technology already exists and also there is unmet industrial market demand for the technology. The "bad" version, client attestation, is already implemented on Android, and could be implemented elsewhere but is only a parallel concept. There is unmet industrial market demand for the (IMO) "not so bad / maybe even good" version, server attestation.