>We are building cryptographically verifiable integrity into Linux systems. Every system starts in a verified state and stays trusted over time.

What problem does this solve for Linux or people who use Linux? Why is this different from me simply enabling encryption on the drive?

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NekkoDroid 2 hours ago | parent | next [-]

Drive encryption is only really securing your data at rest, not while the system is running. Ideally image based systems also use the kernels runtime integrity checking (e.g. dm-verity) to ensure that things are as they are expected to be.

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cwillu 2 hours ago | parent [-]

“ensure that things are as they are expected to be” according to who, and for who's benefit? Certainly not the person sitting in front of the computer.

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NekkoDroid an hour ago | parent | next [-]

The system owner. Usually that is the same entity that owns the secure boot keys, which can be the person that bought a device or another person if the buyer decides to delegate that responsibility (whether knowingly or unknowingly).

In my case I am talking about myself. I prefer to actually know what is running on my systems and ensure that they are as I expect them to be and not that they may have been modified unbeknownst to me.

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rcxdude an hour ago | parent | prev [-]

This is only the case if the person sitting in front of it does not own the keys.

	▲	cwillu 9 minutes ago \| parent [-]
		And from this you can safely conclude that users will be under severe pressure to surrender them.

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Nextgrid 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

It prevents malware that obtained root access once from forever replacing your kernel/initrd and achieving persistence that way.