| ▲ | jandrewrogers 4 hours ago |
| This just adds confusion as to the purpose of all this. The motivation behind the liquid limits is that there are extremely powerful explosives that are stable water-like liquids. Average people have never heard of them because they aren’t in popular lore. There has never been an industrial or military use, solids are simpler. Nonetheless, these explosives are easily accessible to a knowledgeable chemist like me. These explosives can be detected via infrared spectroscopy but that isn’t going to be happening to liquids in your bag. This reminds me of the chemical swipes done on your bags to detect explosives. Those swipes can only detect a narrow set of explosive chemistries and everyone knows it. Some explosives notoriously popular with terror organizations can’t be detected. Everyone, including the bad guys, knows all of this. It would be great if governments were more explicit about precisely what all of this theater is intended to prevent. |
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| ▲ | edm0nd 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] |
| Correct. In the US, the TSA is just a government jobs program for the lowly skilled or unskilled. It's all security theater. TSA Chief Out After Agents Fail 95 Percent of Airport Breach Tests "In one case, an alarm sounded, but even during a pat-down, the screening officer failed to detect a fake plastic explosive taped to an undercover agent's back. In all, so-called "Red Teams" of Homeland Security agents posing as passengers were able get weapons past TSA agents in 67 out of 70 tests — a 95 percent failure rate, according to agency officials." https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/investigation-breaches-... |
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| ▲ | fc417fc802 an hour ago | parent | next [-] | | I find it interesting to contrast this with my experience flying out of China. I was taken to a private room and shown the digital colored X-ray of my bag on which a box had been drawn around an empty lighter, I was asked to remove it myself and hand it over, and I went on my way. All in under 5 minutes, no pat down, no fuss, and no one physically rifled through my belongings. (Granted I was a tourist so that might well not be typical.) I'm not sure what their success rate is when tested by professionals but the experience definitely left me wondering WTF the deal with the TSA is. | | |
| ▲ | 2muchcoffeeman 5 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | Once at a security checkpoint to a museum in Shanghai, they saw my water bottle, and then told me to take it out and drink from it. | |
| ▲ | wakawaka28 42 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | A lighter is very different from a weapon. I'm sure they can see everything they need to see with X-rays. Do you think they find a white guy flying out of China to be a likely terrorist? (I'm assuming you are white or asian.) I've never had a bad experience with TSA but I hate taking off my shoes and all. I really question the value of those security measures. | | |
| ▲ | fc417fc802 7 minutes ago | parent [-] | | I haven't had any particularly bad experiences with the TSA either but I have been physically searched a few times. The entire process is definitely slower and more involved. The contrast of that coupled with the published failure statistics just leaves me wondering. I'd rather we got rid of them but if we must keep them I think we could do at least a bit better. |
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| ▲ | JasonADrury 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | I routinely conceal large bottles of liquids on my person while going through airport security. I've probably gone through airport security in various places with a 1.5L bottle of water more than a hundred times now. Haven't been caught once, although of course the US-style scanners could presumably defeat this. Same with hot sauces, perfume and the occasional bottles of wine. I really don't like to travel with a checked-in luggage, so this is a frequent problem. Luckily I own lots of Rick Owens clothes with large hidden pockets. | | |
| ▲ | grepfru_it 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | A plastic water bottle isn’t triggering a tsa pre check metal detector. I’m totally doing this next trip | | |
| ▲ | kleiba an hour ago | parent [-] | | I've never done that yet I've never had any trouble finding water past security or even on a plane?! | | |
| ▲ | michaelt 35 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | Airport prices in the UK for recreational travel work like so: Flight from London to Barcelona: £16 Bottle of water past security: £5 Train to airport: £26 Taxi enters drop-off area for 30 seconds: £7 A person who wants to get the advertised flight at the advertised price has to be very careful. | | |
| ▲ | jeffwass 17 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | Even in your own car dropping off your friends or family at a UK airport (at least the London ones) requires paying a £6 fee now. Just to get to the dropoff area, even for 30 seconds as you say. But hey, at least the luggage carts are free… | |
| ▲ | kakacik 19 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Price of water from water fountain (to be found on basically any western airport and most non-western I've ever been to) - 0. I get your approach, but say where we live (Switzerland) if you have something not tightly around your body like a fleece jacket, you have to take it off and put it through scanner, this is default. Sometimes they still ask me to go down to t-shirt even if its obvious I don't have anything in pockets. Not worth the hassle for something that is mostly free and probably healthier compared to plastic bottles stored god knows where and how long. I'd imagine if they catch you, you are going for more detailed inspection since its obvious you didn't forget 1kg bottle in clothing you wear by accident. | |
| ▲ | gizajob 19 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | Yeah it’s got out and out criminal at this point. Not sure why we should accept a £6.40 charge to drop someone or collect someone from an airport when that’s the actual function and necessity of using an airport. I got charged £100 at COUNCIL OWNED Manchester airport for picking up a friend who accidentally had put themselves in the drop off zone rather than the collect zone. Just completely vile and disgusting corporatism at every single level. |
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| ▲ | fc417fc802 an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | When people say "water" here I have to assume they mean "vodka". Otherwise you can just bring an empty bottle and fill it on the other side. It's the toiletries that pose a problem. | | |
| ▲ | JasonADrury an hour ago | parent [-] | | Disappointingly, in my case it's usually just water. I'm walking towards security with my bottle, I can either slip it in my pocket or put it in a bin. Not throwing it away saves a bit of time and quickly becomes the default choice. |
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| ▲ | londons_explore an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | | Some airports charge money for water after security. Others disallow even empty bottles at security screening | | |
| ▲ | fnord123 20 minutes ago | parent [-] | | > Others disallow even empty bottles at security screening I haven't encountered this. Could you name some? |
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| ▲ | unclad5968 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | > In the US, the TSA is just a government jobs program for the lowly skilled or unskilled. It's all security theater. This matches my experience. I recently flew out of a small airport that flies 2 fairchild metro 23 turboprop planes up to 9 passengers. There were four TSA agents to check the 5 of us that were flying. | | |
| ▲ | bruce511 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | You gotta love the TSA. They serve no real purpose, but its a monster too big to kill, staffed by people who desperately cling to the notion they're doing something important. They don't stop hijackings (locking the cockpit door does that), they don't stop bombings (there are much better targets for that, which don't involve killing the bomber), they don't stop weapons (lots of airports outside the US have simple metal detectors for that.) They do however cost the govt a lot of money, keep a lot of expensive-machine-makers, and in business, improve shampoo sales at destinations, waste a lot of passenger time and so on. So... what's not to love? | | |
| ▲ | ssl-3 2 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | The grunts working for TSA on the floor at airports aren't desperately clinging for the notion that they're doing something important, or working towards some lofty, noble, and/or altruistic goal. It's just a job. They're principally motivated to do this job by the promise of a steady paycheck and decent benefits -- the same motivation that most other people with steady paychecks and decent benefits also have. | | |
| ▲ | dataengineer56 4 minutes ago | parent [-] | | In my experience many of them do feel like they're doing something important, and some seem principally motivated to do the job by the promise of being able to bully travellers. |
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| ▲ | matwood 15 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | > They don't stop hijackings (locking the cockpit door does that) 9/11 also stopped all future hijackings. Up to that point passengers were trained that if they stayed calm they would likely survive. Now? Short of the hijackers getting guns on the plane, passengers will absolutely fight back. > they don't stop bombings (there are much better targets for that, which don't involve killing the bomber) Suicide bombers are probably the main vector that TSA helps avoid even if they miss some items sometimes. | |
| ▲ | closewith 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | > they don't stop bombings (there are much better targets for that, which don't involve killing the bomber), I think you should read: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_airliner_bombing_a... The only reason you believe aircraft bombings aren't being stopped is because you live in a world where rigourous security has stopped all aircraft bombings. | | |
| ▲ | reeredfdfdf 2 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Yeah. The "security theater" absolutely does play its part in stopping attacks. Without it, airplanes would be an extremely easy target for any nutjob to commit mass murder in. They wouldn't even necessarily need a bomb, anything that can cause a big enough fire mid-flight could be potentially catastrophic. Over past few decades many airliners have crashed because out of control fire in the cabin / cargo hold. I really don't want it to be easy for any random person to cause such fire. | | |
| ▲ | fc417fc802 an hour ago | parent | next [-] | | > Without it, airplanes would be an extremely easy target for any nutjob to commit mass murder in. They still are, but I'm not comfortable spelling out details. The 95% TSA failure rate should lead you to this conclusion naturally. > They wouldn't even necessarily need a bomb, anything that can cause a big enough fire mid-flight could be potentially catastrophic. People have plenty of such things with them as it currently stands. Plenty more can be trivially brought on board in a checked bag or even pocket. But again I'm not going to spell it out. > I really don't want it to be easy for any random person to cause such fire. Well that's unfortunate because it already is. I think the primary things protecting passengers are the cost of entry (the true nutjobs don't tend to be doing so well financially) and the passengers themselves. Regarding the latter, the shoe bomber was subdued by his fellow passengers. | |
| ▲ | sethammons 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Did you drop a sarcasm tag? Anyone can make a fire on a plane as they allow lighters on a plane, and batteries, and any number of flammable objects. None of that is facing any scrutiny nor stopping crazy people from being crazy. | | |
| ▲ | wakawaka28 31 minutes ago | parent [-] | | I've heard that cell phones often catch fire on planes, and the crews know how to deal with that. I guess they have to because the odds of one going up are pretty good across so many flights. |
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| ▲ | wakawaka28 33 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | Most would-be attackers are not suicidal, I suppose. You would have to be in order to start a fire on a plane that you are on. |
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| ▲ | VBprogrammer an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Trains are a much easier target in most countries. Generally only the high-speed / cross border ones have any security at all. Until maybe 10 years ago you didn't even really need a ticket to get access to one (now ticket barriers are common). | |
| ▲ | thaumasiotes 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | There's a pretty strong trend in that timeline of two types of "bombings": (1) Bombings in which the bomb is supplied by someone who isn't flying on the plane; (2) Failed hijackings in which there was no intent to bomb the plane, but a bomb accidentally went off. |
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| ▲ | throwaway290 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | > they don't stop weapons (lots of airports outside the US have simple metal detectors for that.) There are 3D printed guns. | | |
| ▲ | fc417fc802 an hour ago | parent | next [-] | | Those tend to have extremely limited usefulness. Good enough to assassinate a single person at point blank range before they catastrophically fail but (unless something has changed) not much else. Plastic just isn't cut out for the job. | |
| ▲ | koshergweilo 28 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | Don't you still need metal bullets for the 3d printed gun? |
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| ▲ | lostlogin 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | > the US, the TSA is just a government jobs program for the lowly skilled or unskilled. I thought that was the US military? | | | |
| ▲ | dboreham 11 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | TSA is much more skilled than the security people employed by the airlines that proceeded them. | |
| ▲ | aiisjustanif 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | While still theatre to a degree, that was 11 years ago. | | |
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| ▲ | kstenerud 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| It's about making people feel safe. We're not rational beings, so what do you do about an irrational fear? You invent a magical thing that protects from that irrational fear. You're orders of magnitude more likely to die in a road accident, but people don't fear that. They fear terrorist attacks far more. You can't protect against an opponent who's motivated to learn the inherent vulnerabilities of our systems, many of which can't be protected against due to the laws of physics and practicality - short of forcing everyone to travel naked and strapped in like cattle, with no luggage. And even then, what about the extremist who works for the airline? So you invent some theater to stop people from panicking (a far more real danger). And that's a perfectly acceptable solution. |
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| ▲ | WalterBright 2 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | > You're orders of magnitude more likely to die in a road accident, but people don't fear that. They fear terrorist attacks far more. This can be traced to people in a car believe they can control whether they have an accident or not (and largely can). In an airplane, however, you have no control whatsoever. | | |
| ▲ | kleiba an hour ago | parent [-] | | > This can be traced to people in a car believe they can control whether they have an accident or not (and largely can). This is true. In France, about two thirds out of the people dying in a car accident are the actual drivers responsible for the accident, according to the 2024 Road Safety Report. | | |
| ▲ | Dylan16807 16 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | "largely" is true, but because planes are more than 3x safer people are still being wrong when they fear plane travel. People try to treat "largely" as "fully" and that fails. | |
| ▲ | gambiting an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | | And if France it's anything like the UK, the absolute vast majority of these deaths are people driving drunk at night. If you are driving in city traffic at 20mph commuting to work your chance of dying is nearly zero - there's always a chance someone else might be speeding and crash into you, sure, but it's nowhere near the general rate of deaths in cars. As a seque to this - knowing the above, I find it insane that various institutions are pushing for more and more aggressive driving aids. |
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| ▲ | dingaling 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | > It's about making people feel safe. I don't think that's a common perception of airport security. Few people take reassurance from it, most consider it a burden and hindrance that could stop them getting their flight if they don't perform the correct steps as instructed. The lifting of this restriction is an example, the overwhelming response is "oh thank goodness, now I don't have to pay for overpriced water" and not "is this safe?" | | |
| ▲ | palata an hour ago | parent [-] | | I disagree. It is a burden and hindrance, but I'm pretty sure that if you just removed all the checks and let people board like in a bus, there would be complaints. | | |
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| ▲ | wickedsight 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | > It's about making people feel safe. My guess it's more about being able to say: 'We did everything we could.' If someone does end up getting a bomb on board. If they didn't do this, everyone would be angry and headlines would be asking: 'Why was nothing put in place to prevent this?' | | | |
| ▲ | BrenBarn 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | I seriously doubt that most people are happy with the tradeoffs of safety vs. convenience provided by the TSA. The general idea of x-ray, metal detectors, sure, that's all good. But the stuff with taking off your shoes, small containers of liquid, etc., no. I think if we reverted to a simpler system with fewer oddly specific requirements layered on top, most people would not feel significantly less safe, but would feel less inconvenienced. | | |
| ▲ | stephen_g 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | The thing about shoes is just dumb anyway - I don't know if there was some period of time where it was required elsewhere around the world but I never experienced it. Literally the only times I've ever had to take off my shoes were during the two times I've visited the US (vs. a over a dozen trips to European and Asian countries). Liquid restrictions were also lifted in my country four or so years ago for domestic travel, so it's still annoying when getting ready for an international trip and I remember I still have to do that... |
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| ▲ | closewith 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | > You can't protect against an opponent who's motivated to learn the inherent vulnerabilities of our systems, many of which can't be protected against due to the laws of physics and practicality - short of forcing everyone to travel naked and strapped in like cattle, with no luggage. And even then, what about the extremist who works for the airline? This is said as an axiom, but we have protected against the motivated terrorist, as shown by the safety record. | | |
| ▲ | Muromec an hour ago | parent | next [-] | | Mitivated terrorists pivoted to driving cars into crowds and shootings. | | | |
| ▲ | BrenBarn 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Have we protected against the motivated terrorist, or only the motivated terrorist on an airplane? |
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| ▲ | peyton 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | It’s a $12 bn/yr production. I don’t think that’s perfectly acceptable. Let’s invest in loudspeakers if all we’re doing is shouting at people. | |
| ▲ | troupo 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | > You can't protect against an opponent who's motivated to learn the inherent vulnerabilities of our systems, many of which can't be protected against due to the laws of physics and practicality Ah yes, the insidious opponent who learns the inherent vulnerability of ... huge crowds gathering before hand baggage screenings and TSA patdowns. And these crowds are only there only due to a permanent immovable physical fixture of ... completely artificial barriers that fail to prevent anything 90-95% of the time. |
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| ▲ | davedx an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| On one hand, I think it's a valid criticism to say it's security theatre, to a degree. After 9/11, something had to be done, fast!, and we're still living with the after effects of that. On the other hand: defence in depth. No security screening is perfect. Plastic guns can get through metal detectors but we still use them. Pat downs at nightclubs won't catch a razor blade concealed in someone's bra. We try to catch more common dangerous items with the knowledge that there's a long tail of things that could get through. There's nothing really new there, I don't think? |
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| ▲ | omnicognate 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| > Average people have never heard of them because they aren’t in popular lore. Everything I know about liquid explosives I learned from Die Hard 3. |
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| ▲ | breppp 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| most of airport security rests on the notion of going over a series of long tests will elicit unusual (fear, stress) responses from malicious actors and these can then be flagged for even thorougher checks which will then eventually lead to discovery, banning or removal of luggage so it's not the test accuracy by itself but rather then the fact that these tests are happening at all |
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| ▲ | wedog6 40 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | You have surprising faith that the system is well designed. Malicious actors don't get as stressed as normal people who don't want to miss their flight about the long series of obviously pointless tests. Why would they? And there isn't anyone who surveils the queues and takes the worried looking for further checks. This can happen around immigration checks. It happens for flights to Israel. But not in routine airport security. | |
| ▲ | KingMob 19 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | This kind of thinking is as legitimate as believing lie detectors work, i.e., not at all. |
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| ▲ | hackingonempty 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| > The motivation behind the liquid limits is that there are extremely powerful explosives that are stable water-like liquids. The limits were instituted after discovering a plot to smuggle acetone and hydrogen peroxide (and ice presumably) on board to make acetone peroxide in the lavatory. TATP is not a liquid and it is not stable. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_transatlantic_aircraft_pl... |
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| ▲ | jandrewrogers 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | This illustrates a point though. TATP you could synthesize on a plane is entirely inadequate to bring down a plane. It also requires a bit more than acetone and hydrogen peroxide. Pan Am 103 required around half a kilo of RDX and TATP is very, very far from RDX. The idea of synthesizing a proper high-explosive in an airplane lavatory is generally comical. The chemistry isn’t too complex but you won’t be doing it in an airplane lavatory. | | |
| ▲ | closewith 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | > TATP you could synthesize on a plane is entirely inadequate to bring down a plane Even a small fire can down a plane, especially when distant from diversion airports. | | |
| ▲ | jandrewrogers 2 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | No, you can’t bring down a plane with a small fire. If that was possible terrorists would use a newspaper and a lighter. | |
| ▲ | lores an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | | They don't block lithium batteries, so... |
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| ▲ | wiredfool 18 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| In Zurich, you can buy Swiss army knives in the secure zone. |
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| ▲ | duskdozer 12 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Security theater and conditioning people into accepting invasions of privacy |
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| ▲ | fooker 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| These liquids show up as slightly different colors in the new CT scan machines and this can finally be reliably detected by software. This is also why a bunch of airports no longer ask you to take electronics out of your bags. |
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| ▲ | scq 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| From my understanding, the new CT machines are able to characterise material composition using dual-energy X-ray, and this is how they were able to relax the rules. |
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| ▲ | jandrewrogers 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | I am not up-to-date on the bleeding edge but that explanation doesn’t seem correct? The use of x-rays in analytical chemistry is for elemental analysis, not molecular analysis. (There are uses for x-rays in crystallography that but that is unrelated to this application.) At an elemental level, the materials of a suitcase are more or less identical to an explosive. You won’t easily be able to tell them apart with an x-ray. This is analogous to why x-ray assays of mining ores can’t tell you what the mineral is, only the elements that are in the minerals. FWIW, I once went through an airport in my travels that took an infrared spectra of everyone’s water! They never said that, I recognized the equipment. I forget where, I was just impressed that the process was scientifically rigorous. That would immediately identify anything weird that was passed off as water. | | |
| ▲ | wyldfire 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Here's an article that talks about Dual-energy CT [1]. And another one talking about material discrimination using DECT [2]. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectral_imaging_(radiography) [2] https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC2719491/ | | |
| ▲ | jandrewrogers 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | Neither of those articles seem to support the idea that you can do molecular analysis with x-rays. They are all about elemental analysis, which is not useful for the purpose of detecting explosives. | | |
| ▲ | littlecranky67 an hour ago | parent | next [-] | | Not sure if they use dual-energy x-ray as in [0], but you don't need to if you take x-ray shot from different angles. Modern 3D reconstruction algorithms you can detect shape and volume of an object and estimate the material density through its absorption rate. A 100ml liquid explosive in a container will be distinguishable from water (or pepsi) by material density, which can be estimate from volume and absorption rate. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual-energy_X-ray_absorptiomet... | |
| ▲ | don_esteban an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | | Hm, isn't it enough to just detect water and flag everything else as suspicious? If your liquid is 80%+ water (that covers all juices and soft drinks), it is not going to be an explosive, too much thermal ballast. |
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| ▲ | palata an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | | > FWIW, I once went through an airport in my travels that took an infrared spectra of everyone’s water! They never said that, I recognized the equipment. I forget where, I was just impressed that the process was scientifically rigorous. That would immediately identify anything weird that was passed off as water. Something like 10 years ago, I had my water checked in a specialised "bottle of water checker" equipment in Japan. I had to put my bottle there, it took a second and that was it. I have been wondering why this isn't more common ever since :-). No idea if it was an "infrared spectra machine" of course. |
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| ▲ | altern8 42 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I'm fine with some liquid potentially being explosives, but the fact that security just throws them all in the same bin when they confiscate them makes me think that not even they believe it makes any sense. Also, why 100ml? Do you need 150ml to make the explosive? Couldn't there be 2 terrorists with 100ml + 50ml? All these questions, so little answers... |
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| ▲ | AndrewThrowaway an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I believe the "theater" is needed precisely for this - to catch bad actors. There could just be a long queue with some blind dog and scary looking guy at the end. What it still does is makes a bad guy sweat, plan against it and etc. You just can't have free entrance for all. However you will never prevent state actors or similar with any kind of theatre because they will always prepare for it. |
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| ▲ | sschueller 32 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Is a open flame enough to ignite those liquids and don't they need something to press against to "explode" and not just cause a giant flame like gasoline? |
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| ▲ | bawolff 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I thought the point of replacing all the xray scanners with CT scanners was to be able to detect this sort of thing? |
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| ▲ | JumpCrisscross 35 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| > These explosives can be detected via infrared spectroscopy but that isn’t going to be happening to liquids in your bag There are more ways to find them. Look up Z score. TL; DR New detectors can discriminate water from explosives. Old ones couldn’t. None of them are doing IR spectroscopy. |
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| ▲ | CorrectHorseBat 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| So how does that explain I can take 10 100ml bottles and an empty 1l bottle through security but not 1 full 1l bottle? |
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| ▲ | WalterBright 2 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | The same reason used for WA emissions inspections (since suspended). If your tailpipe emitted 99ppm of pollutants, you were good to go. If it emitted 100ppm, you had to get it fixed. Good ole step functions. | |
| ▲ | opello an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | You have to be able to fit those 10 100mL bottles into a single 1 quart resealable bag. At most you'd probably get about 9.46 of those 10 bottles in the bag but in practice it's fewer still. 1 US liquid quart is about 946.353 milliliters. | | |
| ▲ | gambiting 43 minutes ago | parent [-] | | >>1 US liquid quart is about 946.353 milliliters. Why not just say 1 litre and have the same limit as the rest of the world. | | |
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| ▲ | gizzlon 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | You can't, at least not where I live |
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| ▲ | wbl 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Won't asking people to take a swig solve a bunch of those issues? |
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| ▲ | jandrewrogers 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | This was done! It created terrible publicity incidents like the TSA forcing women to drink their own breast milk to prove it was safe. And not all liquids subject to this are things a person should swig even if they aren’t explosives. The extremely negative PR rightly stopped this practice. | | |
| ▲ | bdavbdav 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | Is that practice not really common? I’ve seen that done as a matter of course on lots of international airports with baby food / liquid and no one seems to get too fussed about it. |
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| ▲ | jrockway 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | People travel with liquids they don't intend to eat. Shampoo and all that. There is also nothing that precludes explosives from being non-toxic. Presumably your demise is near if you are carrying explosives through security. What do you care about heavy metal poisoning at that point? | | |
| ▲ | chipsrafferty 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | But also you can fill up a water bottle after security. Wouldn't it be fairly easy to make a pen or similar innocuous item out of sodium, and drop it in a bottle of water to make an explosion? My point is that security can never be strict enough to catch someone who's truly motivated and funded, without making it impossible to admit people at a reasonable pace, and the current rules don't really help with that except for cutting down on the riff raff terrorists. But maybe those are more common than a trained professional with high tech weapons, I don't know. | | |
| ▲ | jandrewrogers 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | FWIW, sodium in water is such a pathetic explosion that it would mostly be an embarrassment for the would-be bomber. It wouldn’t do any meaningful damage. An explosion with real gravitas is far more difficult to execute than people imagine. (see also: people that think ANFO is a viable explosive) This goes a long way in explaining why truly destructive bombings are rare. | | |
| ▲ | WalterBright 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | Airliners are also pretty robust against damage. Although they are not designed to resist explosions, everything is redundant. This robustness is why fighters in WW2 used cannons for guns. Poking a hole in the side won't do anything. |
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| ▲ | closewith 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | > My point is that security can never be strict enough to catch someone who's truly motivated and funded, without making it impossible to admit people at a reasonable pace, and the current rules don't really help with that except for cutting down on the riff raff terrorists. This is the classic HN developer arrogance and oversimplification, but let's accept this as true for argument's sake. It turns out that "riff raff terrorists" are the only ones we needed to stop as there's been no successful bombings of Western airlines in 25 years, and there have been foiled attempts. The existence of master locksmiths (and door breaching charges) doesn't mean you shouldn't lock your door at night. | | |
| ▲ | WalterBright 2 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | And nobody's going to fall for that "open the cockpit door or I kill the flight attendant" again. | |
| ▲ | sgjohnson 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | > and there have been foiled attempts. have there? | |
| ▲ | troupo 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | > The existence of master locksmiths (and door breaching charges) doesn't mean you shouldn't lock your door at night. The TSA checkpoints are the equivalent of moving all your belongings onto the lawn, and then locking the door. Why bother with the plane when now you have potentialy a magnitude more people in the queue to TSA? |
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| ▲ | HNisCIS 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| OP is talking about (mostly) TATP here. It's very easy to make, harder to detect with traditional methods and potent enough to be a problem. It's also hilariously unstable, will absolutely kill you before you achieve terrorism, and if you ask people on the appropriate chemistry subreddits how to make it you'll be ridiculed for days. |
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| ▲ | jandrewrogers 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | Yes, peroxide chemistries famously don’t show up on a lot of explosive scans. TATP is an example but not the only one and far from the best one. They are largely missing from common literature because they are too chemically reactive to be practical e.g. they will readily chemically interact with their environment, including most metal casings you might put them in, such that they become non-explosive. That aside, TATP is a terrible explosive. Weak, unstable, and ineffective. The ridicule is well-deserved. |
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| ▲ | vkou 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| > . This reminds me of the chemical swipes done on your bags to detect explosives. Those swipes can only detect a narrow set of explosive chemistries and everyone knows it. Meanwhile, you get swabbed, the machine produces a false positive, the TSA drone asks you why the machine is showing a positive, you have no fucking idea why, and they just keep swabbing until they get a green light and everyone moves on with life. |
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| ▲ | CTDOCodebases 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| The security theatre is there to make people feel safe. It's about emotion not logic. |
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| ▲ | JellyPlan 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I wonder if the improvements can detect trigger mechanisms better rather than testing the liquid itself. |
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| ▲ | jandrewrogers 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | Sophisticated detonators are very small. The size is well below anything you’d be able to notice on an x-ray. Trying to detect detonators is an exercise in futility. Fortunately, a detonator by itself can’t do any damage. |
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| ▲ | kanbara an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| how does it add confusion? if normal people don’t know, criminals/terrorists do, and the materials are commonplace but not screened for, then everything about the current approach is wrong. and when has a plane been brought down by the evil explosives or stable liquids in recent memory? so the theatre put in place is just that, huh? |
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| ▲ | 4gotunameagain 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| > Everyone, including the bad guys, knows all of this. Then satisfy our curiosity and provide more details as to which are the liquid explosives and which common ones are not detected ? ;) |
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| ▲ | yieldcrv 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| > It would be great if governments were more explicit about precisely what all of this theater is intended to prevent. Have you considered just going long Palantir? there's nothing to really understand |
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| ▲ | SanjayMehta 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Security theatre. And speaking of theatre in the air, most Indian airlines will make an announcement of turbulence just before food service starts. This is to make the sheep - strike that - passengers go back to their seats and sit down. |
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| ▲ | 7e 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| It's obvious. The harder you make it to down or hijack a plane, the fewer downed planes you will see. It didn't have to be perfect to prevent and deter. Some security is better than no security. If you had no security at all you would see planes go down all the time. And it wouldn't surprise me if some of the detection technology were classified. It would not be "great" if governments were more open about their detection capabilities; that would cause more terrorism attempts and is one of the stupidest things one could do here. |
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| ▲ | troupo 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | > The harder you make it to down or hijack a plane, the fewer downed planes you will see. You know that TSA fails in 90-95% of cases and that crowds before it are a much jucier target? |
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| ▲ | contingencies 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] |
| Ahh, the naïvety of the scientific mind! The security theater is intended to prevent government beaurocrats' mates from having to get real jobs and keep them happily sponging off public money. Also, set themselves up for post-career high paid gigs with those same private sector beneficiaries, so they can't be done for corruption during their career. Yes, really. Ask an AI about mid to late career public sector transitions to private sector and cross-examine 100 top examples across markets perceived as 'low corruption index'. |
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| ▲ | boomskats 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | You mean Tony didn't really make £20m in his first year out of office from just giving speeches? I mean, that's what his tax return says? You, sir, are a _conspiracy theorist_. Don't let that rotating door catch you on the way back in. |
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