Sure. Or the supply chain attacker (who is perhaps a state-level actor if you want to think really spicy thoughts) selling you a device on Amazon you think is secure, that they messed with when it passed through their hands on its way to you.

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c22 an hour ago | parent [-]

The state level supply chain attacker can just replace the entire chip, or any other part of the product. No amount of technical wizardry can prevent this.

	▲	QuiEgo 33 minutes ago \| parent [-]
		Modern devices try to prevent this by cryptographically entangling the firmware on the flash to the chip - e.x. encrypting it with a device-unique key from a PUF. So if you replace the chip, it won't be able to decrypt the firmware on flash or boot. The evil of the type of attack here is that the firmware with an exploit would be properly signed, so the firmware update systems on the chip would install it (and encrypt it with the PUF-based key) unless you have anti-rollback. Of course, with a skilled enough attacker, anything is possible.