This is the flight where one pilot tried to pull up to recover from the stall, and the warning for dual input (which Airbus just averages together) was snoozed by the system yelling about the other errors and was reduced to a light they didn't notice. The captain commented towards the end"no don't climb". The stall alarm was the one the system chose to display over all others and was mishandled (by the pilot who didn't know how to recover from a stall).

Boeing there's physical feed back, when one control moves so does the other.

This was not the first time pilots were having conflicting input without noticing.

>https://bea.aero/uploads/tx_elyextendttnews/annexe.01.en.pdf

IMO that’s the wrong take about that crash. The stall warning stopped once the attitude was above a certain amount, which was an insane decision on airbus’s part.

You can see in the CVR that the stall indicator stopped many times despite them being in a stall the entire time. The pilot (like every other pilot) knew how to recover from a stall on paper. But he had the plane telling him his airspeed was good (frozen tube) and that bringing the pitch down was causing a stall.