Everything in an LLM is "evaluated," so I'm not sure where the confusion comes from. We need to be careful when we use `eval()` and we need to be careful when we tell LLMs secrets. The Claude issue above is trivially solved by blocking the use of commands like curl or manually specifiying what domains are allowed (if we're okay with curl).

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stavros 6 hours ago | parent [-]

The confusion comes from the fact that you're saying "it's easy to solve this particular case" and I'm saying "it's currently impossible to solve prompt injection for every case".

Since the original point was about solving all prompt injection vulnerabilities, it doesn't matter if we can solve this particular one, the point is wrong.

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dvt 5 hours ago | parent [-]

> Since the original point was about solving all prompt injection vulnerabilities...

All prompt injection vulnerabilities are solved by being careful with what you put in your prompt. You're basically saying "I know `eval` is very powerful, but sometimes people use it maliciously. I want to solve all `eval()` vulnerabilities" -- and to that, I say: be careful what you `eval()`. If you copy & paste random stuff in `eval()`, then you'll probably have a bad time, but I don't really see how that's `eval()`'s problem.

If you read the original post, it's about uploading a malicious file (from what's supposed to be a confidential directory) that has hidden prompt injection. To me, this is comparable to downloading a virus or being phished. (It's also likely illegal.)

	▲	acjohnson55 3 hours ago \| parent [-]
		The problem is that most interesting applications of LLMs require putting data into them that isn't completely vetted ahead of time.