Another week, another agent "allowlist" bypass. Been prototyping a "prepared statement" pattern for agents: signed capability warrants that deterministically constrain tool calls regardless of what the prompt says. Prompt injection corrupts intent, but the warrant doesn't change.

Curious if anyone else is going down this path.

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ramoz 7 hours ago | parent [-]

I would like to know more. I’m with a startup in this space.

Our focus is “verifiable computing” via cryptographic assurances across governance and provenance.

That includes signed credentials for capability and intent warrants.

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niyikiza 6 hours ago | parent [-]

Interesting. Are you focused on the delegation chain (how capabilities flow between agents) or the execution boundary (verifying at tool call time)? I've been mostly on the delegation side.

Working on this at github.com/tenuo-ai/tenuo. Would love to compare approaches. Email in profile?

	▲	ramoz 6 hours ago \| parent [-]
		No, right in the weeds of delegation. I reached out on one channel that you'll see.